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This dissertation w?,s !.Ir.dertaken to examine and review the theo-
retica1 issues concerning decision-making. From this analysis, a new 
and innovative technique for problem-solving was developed, entitled 
Integrated Management Decision-making. The underlying theoretical 
framework of this model involved the integration of the organizat"ion 
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and the environment. Political, economic, social, cultural, and other 
community factors were discussed as major influences in the decision-
making process. Integrated Management Decision-Making was derived 
from the combination of four existing theoretical perspectives: (1) 
decision-making is a process; (2) decision-making involves the ability 
to make rational choices; (3) decision-making assumes a systematic 
methodology; and (4) decision-making is conducted by human beings 
attempting to achieve a desired consequence or result. 
Further, this study addressed the application of this new model 
to the task of police patrol deployment in small urban centers. The 
City of Jonesboro, Arkansas was used as a test case for the demonstra-
tion of this process. 
After examining over 8,300 radio-dispatched calls for service in 
1980, a method for deployment was proposed utilizing Integrated 
Management Decision-Making. 
The statistic~l techniques of Multiple Response Analysis and 
Kruska1-Wa11is Analysis of Variance by Ranks were utilized to explore 
the relationship between existing patrol procedures and proposed 
deployment design based on specific allocation variables designated by 
the police manager. The objective of the new deployment plan was to 
achieve an optimum patrol scheme with equalized workload between 
districts. This involved the determination of several decision-
products: (1) the calculation of an assignment-availability factor; 
(2) the design of sector boundaries; (3) the calculation of shift 
requirements; and (4) the assessment of patrol strategies and 
techniques. This goal was achieved and recommendations for the 
Jonesboro Police Department were developed. 
Finally, Integrated Management Decision-Making was discussed as a 
catalyst for change in current police management thinking. Futuristic 
concepts of organization-environmental lGarning, long-range planning, 
and strategic modeling were suggested as necessary improvements in 
police decison-making. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The efficient and effective use of police manpower has always 
been a problem, however, it has become increasingly serious in the 
last few years. That part of serious crime (reported to the police) 
in the United States has nearly doubled in the last decade, both 
totally and categorically, and the demand for police services has kept 
pace with this increase. 1 Clearly, this phenomenal increase in 
criminal activity has produced major and, in some areas, critical 
demands on the resources of municipal police agencies, i.e., person-
nel, facility, equipment, etc. 2 Unlike the 1960's and early 1970's, 
law enforcement agencies were unable to expand their level of service 
delivery because of a reluctance on the part of the local officials to 
continually increase the police budget. This reluctance can be attri-
buted to several factors. For example, much of law enforcement's 
expansion during the last 15 years can be traced to the creation of 
the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which provided 
substantial financial resources allegedly to improve police opera-
tions. Recently, a dramatic revision in the agency's guidelines and 
goals has severely cut what was once a relatively large fund for local 
police service improvement. 3 
To make financial matters even worse, an inflationary economy has 
produced further constraints and burdens on urban police budgets. 
Major increases in gasoline prices and labor/personnel costs have 
forced many local governments to consider themselves in a state of 
crisis. 4 Faced with rising crime and increased calls for service, a 
growing city would have traditionally sought to add more sworn police 
personnel. However', the inflationary cost to initially hire, train, 
and equip one patrol officer now ranges from $10,000 to $35,000 as 
compared to $5,000 to $12,000 just ten years ago. Such personnel 
costs account for 91 to 97 percent of the average department's total 
budget. 5 Adding manpower may no longer be economically feasible; in 
fact, that option may not even be available to law enforcement 
managers in the current economic environment. With these dilemmas, it 
is understandable why city administrators are reluctant to increase 
police budgets. 
To exacerbate this fiscal crisis, there is a current social and 
political movement that scrutinizes and questions government spend-
ing. Based in part on the public's cry for the efficient use of tax 
revenues, the movement centers around political, awareness and an 
underlying tax revolt. 6 The impending result is an increase of 
political pressure on city governments to justify expenditures. 
Complicating this matter is a set of conflicting evidence about 
the effect of the police on crime. For the last 15 years, the common 
assumption that an increase in law enforcement patrol capability will 
result in a corresponding decrease in crime has been strongly chal-
lenged. 7 Specifically, the well known Kansas City Preventative 
Patrol Experiment produced a plethora of controversy about the 
validity of this assumption. 8 The study attempted to determine the 
effect routine patrol had on a number of different crime-related 
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measures. Different patrol techniques were used in three beats of the 
city. The "reactive" beat totally eliminated patrol activity, and 
only responded to calls for service. The "control" beat used routine 
patrol manpower with no change in personnel level. The "proactive" 
beat doubled or tripled patrol activity through an increase in man-
power. The results of this study showed that none of the three levels 
of patrol manpower differed significantly in their effect on the level 
of crime as increased by victimization surveys and reported crime. 9 
Although there have been a number of criticisms aimed at the 
validity of the Kansas City study, the results have forced a 
re-examination of the traditional use of more funds and more manpower 
to combat the ever-increasing occurrences of crime. Indeed, James Q. 
Wilson has recently proposed that it may not be the number of police 
on patrol which produce lower crime rates, but the patrol behavior, 
style, or strategy which is employed by individual officers. 10 
These predicaments have been particularly troublesome for small 
urban centers, many of which are almost totally dependent on one 
primary economic base, i.e. farming, construction, mining, etc. 
Further, small cities are often characterized by strong political 
bodies which polarize the community into two separate groups. One is 
composed of those who support law enforcement and are usually asso-
ciated with local business firms, fraternal orders, and small govern-
ment bodies which form a distinct and visible power structure; while 
the other is made up of those who oppose law enforcement, and are fre-
quently viewed as the target of police activities and usually repre-
sents those people who are "watched.~ll This second group is 
usually a segregated minority or a non-conventional public. In other 
3 
words, small cities exhibit a unique political and economic environ-
ment which is more acutely affected by rising crime rates and 
increased calls for service without corresponding increases in 
resources. 12 
Faced with denied requests for additional manpower, it is evident 
that the only realistic course of action left to deal with increasing 
crime and economic problems is to more effectively use the personnel 
and resources currently available within a given police department. 
This means that city managers must increase police productivity by 
improving current police practices to the best level known, that is, 
to get better performance without a proportionate increase in 
cost.1 3 One of the best methods to increase police productivity is 
to develop an allocation design which yields the most effective and 
efficient use of existing police resources. 
The clearest example of increasing productivity is having person-
nel assigned when and where crime is highest or calls for service are 
heaviest. 14 This is the primary goal in allocation design. 
Police Patrol Allocation: An Historical Overview 
Early Developments. The analysis of police patrol allocation in 
the United States began with the work of August Vollmer in Berkeley, 
California, during the early 1900's. Vollmer established a list of 
"police functions" which still appears in all standard manuals on 
municipal po1icing. 15 With little variation, the list of police 
functions consists of the following items: crime prevention, crime 
repression, apprehension, criminal investigation, public service, 
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maintenance of peace and security, regulation of non-criminal 
activities, traffic control, and provision of emergency services. 
According to Vollmer, these functions described the police mission. 
He was the first to associate these functions with a territorial unit 
of work or the "beat." Vollmer's contribution to patrol allocation 
can be viewed twofold. First, he placed a priority emphasis on the 
study of the principles and methods of beat construction by formulat-
ing a criteria of allocation; patrolman should be distributed by areas 
in proportion to the amount of work to be done. 16 And secondly, 
Vollmer initiated the concept of police work as a profession, rooted 
in the freedom of the police from political interference and the 
advancement of technological innovations in patrol assignments. 
Even though Vollmer contributed much to the establishment of 
police professionalism and patrol strategy, there is a profound con-
tradiction in American policing which he failed to address. It is 
futile to assert that the police can be or should be impartial in the 
face of political conflict between urban and rural, s~ate and city, or 
religious and ethnic interest groups.17 This contradiction cannot 
be resolved by blaming undesirable police actions upon illigitimate 
political interference. Contrary to this thought, the police must 
consider, and act within, the political body of the community. This 
\ 
is particularly true in the decision-making process for manpower 
deployment. Political biases and structures must be considered as an 
important form of input for patrol allocation. 
Recognizing this concept as early as 1920, Raymond Fosdick 
expanded on Vollmer's earlier throughts. Noting that patrol deploy-
ment must change and alter with new political, economic, employment, 
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residential, and crime-occurring conditions, Fosdick proposed that the 
type and mode of patrol must adapt to new situations. 18 He was the 
first to recognize the relationship between a changing community 
environment and a patrol strategy or aiiocation design that evolved 
with this situation. 
In 1929, Bruce Smith in his book, Police Systems in the United 
States, recognized still another important aspect in patrol deploy-
ment. Indicating that patrol had been traditionally "distributed on 
an equal, or nearly equal, basis throughout the twenty-four hours of 
the day," despite marked increases in workload and crime occurrences, 
Smith advanced the use of crime analysis in allocation design. 19 
For the first time, patrol distribution was related to activity and 
crime documentation by police records. This was an important step for 
allocation design, as managers recognized the need to deploy personnel 
in an effort to maximize patrol activity during those times of highest 
crime and workload occurrence. 
The Hazard Model. It was not until 1941, that the concept of 
effective distribution through maximum protection was fully realized. 
O. W. Wilson, then Chief o~ Police at Wichita, Kansas, established the 
"relative need" approach to police deployment. Emphasizing the 
redistribution of patrol forces based on a set of "proportionate need 
factors," Wilson utilized the application of law enforcement to the 
locations, during the times and toward the particular criminal viola-
tions which represented the highest police demands. 20 
Elaborating on his original work, Wilson formulated a deployment 
scheme based on allocation by hazard. 21 The formula was first 
initiated in the Los Angeles Police Department in 1953 and with 
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relatively minor changes, is still in use today. Each type of crime 
is given a weighted hazard score and, by prioritizing the incidence of 
crime, a total weighted sum for each region is calculated. The patrol 
personnel are allocated accordingly. 
In a more recent statement concerning allocations by hazard, 
Roy C. McLaren re-emphasizes that "patrolmen should be distributed in 
proportion to the need for police service ••• the essence of the 
distribution problem lies in measuring the proportionate need. 22 
For McLaren and Wilson this problem is remedied by the extensive 
use of a weighted scale in analyzing past historical data. Calls for 
service are examined in relation to a specific geographical area to 
form a criterion ratio. The Los Angeles Police Department exemplifies 
this deployment scheme by using the following ten weighted factors to 
calculate manpower a110cation: 23 
1. Percentage of FBI Index Crime per division (murder, armed 
robbery, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, theft 
over $200.00, and motor vehicle theft). 
2. Percentage of radio calls 
3. Percentage of adult and juvenile felony arrests 
4. Percentage of adult and juvenile misdemeanor arrests 
5. Percentage of property loss 
6. Percentage of fatal and injury traffic accidents 
7. Percentage of vehicles recovered 
8. Percentage of Los Angeles City Population 
9. Percentage of street miles, and 
10. Percentage of population density 
7 
Unfortunately, such weight factors are largely subjective by 
nature and subject to criticism, a problem for which there appears to 
be no guidelines or formulating principles. 24 Further, the hazard 
formula is greatly affected by officer-initiated activity. The number 
of arrests made or crimes detected by officers may be a direct result 
of the number of officers in a particular region, thereby generating a 
spurious "need" for more manpower. On the other hand, the hazard 
formula cannot be dismissed as an erroneous venture in patrol plan-
ning. Established as one of the first analytical methods for deploy-
ment, the hazard formula utilizes a police data base in an attempt to 
equalize workload. It historically marks the first method of deploy-
ment which combined quantitative procedures and intuitive judgment. 
The hazard formula model still remains as one of the most widely 
utilized and accepted methods for municipal police allocation. As 
Donald Shanahan points out: "These weightings are not perfect, but 
until an improved system is developed, the assignment of weights 
according to classes of events is the best available."25 
The Phoenix Model. Employing the hazard formula concept with a 
predictive computer model has been one of the newer innovations for 
manpower deployment based on a proportionate need ratio. In the early 
1960's, Phoenix, Arizona adopted such a system. It can be viewed as a 
sophisticated and natural evolvement from the hazard formula model. 
In the Phoenix method, the basic hazard is defined as the delay 
plus travel plus service times for all calls during a given time 
period in a given place. 26 Cars are deployed by district, shift, 
and day of week in proportion to the fraction of the total citywide 
hazard predicted (by computer adaptation) to occur in that specific 
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time period and geographic region. The computer is used to extrapo-
late data from the previous tel, weeks on the number of incidents and 
elapsed time (defined as delay time plus travel and service time) for 
each shift, day of week, and one-fourth-square-mile geographic 
area. 27 
The Phoenix model proposes two constructive innovations to the 
hazard formula concept. They are (1) the use of predicted calls in 
the method rather than just calls actually experienced in the part and 
(2) the use of elapsed time rather than just volume of calls. 
Unfortunately, the formula still involves the subjective weighting of 
incidents; and in this case, the limitation is even more serious as 
all calls receive the same weighting. Thus, a cold burglary or bark-
ing dog call receives an equal weight with a robbery or crime in pro-
gress. Another inherent weakness in the method is the failure to 
address the preventive and deterrent aspects of patrol. Kakalik and 
Wildhorn note this problem in their work entitled Aids to Decision-
Making in Police Patrol. After administering an exhaustive survey to 
the Phoenix Department, they observe that while approximately 20-25 
percent of a patrolman's time is allocated to preventive patrol, there 
still remains no direct value which can act as a weight or input for 
the computer application in the hazard formula prediction. 28 
Further, as actual time spent on servicing an incident is computed by 
elapsed time factors, a theoretical argument can be raised. Since all 
calls receive the same weight and, the major use of the computer is in 
calculating "elapsed time," then the method does not distribute 
personnel by proportionate workload need but rather by proportionate 
time need. The criticism raised is that such an allocation pla~ must 
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involve a very refined collection system. One which has a much 
broader base of data (than ten weeks) to account for changes in the 
community envir"onment and police policy procedure. If the goal is to 
orovide a capability to plan based on prediction, a much more refined 
~nd comprehensive workload analysis must be undertaken. 
The St. Louis Model. In 1964, Richard F. Crowther proposed a 
series of computer programs for the allocation of police personnel in 
St. Louis, Missouri. 29 These programs were subsequently refined and 
adapted to the St. Louis Police Department by Thomas McEwan. 30 The 
resource allocation project advanced the deployment process by incor-
porating two intricate and innovative techniques: prediction by 
exponential smoothing and assignment of response cars by queuing. 
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The St. Louis method is based on a demand for police services 
predicted by hour and geographic area, using projections based on past 
demand data with modifications for weekly and seasonal variations. 
The prediction method employs a statistical technique called 
"exponential smoothing" that takes into account variations in the call 
rate by time of day, day of week, week of year, and also adjusts for 
overall trends in the call rate (general increase or decrease compared 
to previous year). In effect, the exponential smoothing technique 
estimates future calls by "averaging" the volumes of calls experienced 
in past weeks, with the more recent weeks' data being given the most 
weight. 31 The reslJ.1t is a predicted estimate of the number of calls 
to occur in any given area in each hour of the week. The service 
times of incidents are also smoothed in similar manner. 
By making certain technical assumptions, the prediction model 
asserts that manpower can be distributed on the basis of urgent calls 
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having to wait in delay for a specific length of time before being 
serviced. 32 This is described as a queuing delay. St. Louis allo-
cates personnel based on the probability that, at most, 15 percent of 
each district's calls will be delayed in queue. This predictive func-
tion has produced a unique effect on conventional policing in 
St. Louis. Since the number of response cars is set so that less than 
15 percent of all calls will incur a delay, it is necessary to split 
the patrol division into two entirely distinct functions--one to be 
concerned with answering calls for service (which comprises the 
majority of the patrol force), the second to perform crime prevention 
duties. 
The St. Louis experience was the first major attempt to apply 
mathematical and probability modeling to the task of police manpower 
allocation. Although the exponential smoothing technique has been 
found to be adequately accurate, there are still several weaknesses 
that limit the overall procedure. 33 
First, there appears to be no attempt to take into account "free" 
or "patrol" time of officers on duty. That time which couid not be 
accounted for in elapsed time was "averaged" into the weekly estimate 
of demand. For this reason, it can be assumed that actual delays were 
much higher than those predicted by the computer programs. However, 
in the St. Louis experience, there was a noted excess of resources to 
keep the actual number of calls encountering a queue well under ten 
percent. 34 If such resources had not been available, then the total 
number of response cars would have necessarily been less, resulting in 
a higher percentage of calls incurring a queuing delay. 
Second, the above situation highlights yet another problem. The 
St. Louis deployment method utilizes only ~ criterion within the 
mathematical technique to determine the required number of response 
cars; that being the fraction of calls that cannot be answered 
immediately by a police unit. The necessary assumption is that the 
estimated weekly demand follows a typical pattern over the hours of 
the week. This assumption can be challenged by modern crime specific 
analysis proponents. 35 Further, in order for predictions of 
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criminal behavior to be effective in deployment, the predictions must 
be very delineated as to time and location. Techniques which are 
average or estimate general predictions about police workload and the 
total number of calls for service in a city are simply "not very help-
ful in the day-to-day deployment of police officers."36 
Third, the performance measure (or criterion) of percentage of 
calls delayed does not distinguish priority. All calls have the same 
chance of experiencing a queue. Such a design may well reduce the 
average response time to all calls but may indeed complicate the 
importance of a fast response to a specific call. The question 
arises, "Shou1d a traffic hazard or barking dog call carry the same 
weight as a quick response to an armed robbery in progress?" In the 
St. Louis model, there is no way to distinguish among calls; a 
definite drawback to formulating dispatch policy. 
Finally, and most important, the St. Louis technique (specifi-
cally exponential smoothing) necessitates the user to select one or 
more parameters that distinguish weight between old and new data. If 
patterns in the community and in the workload change rapidly, then an 
increase or decrease in police resources must also accompany the 
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change. The problem lies in continually monitoring and updating the 
computer program with respect to crime trends, community patterns, 
environmental factors, and police department policies and strategies. 
This can be extremely expensive and time consuming. Then too, the 
issue of old versus new data take on another aspect. What parameters 
will be used to account for these extraneous variables in the updating 
stage? Recognizing this fault, police administrators would be subject 
to constant political pressure as to the establishing of update 
criteria. By this time, the allocation plan would be so complex and 
so refined as to detract from its original purpose. Few departments 
would be able to justify the cost in terms of gathering, analyzing, 
and implementing such a deployment plan. 
The LEMRAS Model. LEMRAS is an acronym for Law Enforcement Man-
power Resource Allocation System. It was developed by the IBM 
Corporation and based on the St. l.ouis System. The program is avail-
able for lease to police departments, and several large cities, 
including Philadelphia and Los Angeles have implemented the system. 
The LEMRAS method and the St. Louis model are the same except 
that the LEMRAS program establishes a manner in which calls are 
serviced by priority •. Call$ for sen'ices are divided in a large 
number of event codes. These codes are then assigned into one of 
three priority levels which designate the length of time the call will 
be held in queue. For example, a "cold" burglary may be placed in 
priority three while a robbery in progress is assigned a priority 
one. Calls are then dispatched in order of decreasing priority. 
Thus, all priority one and two calls would be dispatched before any 
priority three call; thereby decreasing the delay time for any high 
priority incident. 
Being so closely related to the St. Louis model, the LEMRAS pro-
gram offers essentially the same benefits and suffers from the same 
limitations. 37 
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Simulation and Travel-Time Models. In 1967, the work of the 
Science and Technology Task Force of the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice marked a major advancement 
in the application of technology and operations research to problems 
of criminal justice. 38 Recommending that operational problems for 
police agencies (such as efficient police patrol allocation) be 
anaiyzed from a quantitative point of view, the Task Force called for 
the use of sophisticated computer techniques, analytic probability 
models, and intricate engineering methods. 
As a result, Richard Larson, from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology focused on the quantitative prospects of analyzing urban 
police patrol. In 1969, he designed a program similar to LEMRAS, how-
ever, much more sophisticated and refined. 
The simulation model is based on an allocation of manpower by 
travel time. Larson prioritizes the expected time of travel to a 
crime based on the relationship of geographical characteristics, 
number of patrol units, and the demand and service rates of 
calls. 39 By using heuristic programming algorithms, a very sophis-
ticated model is produced to search for optimal response times and 
areas. A simulation model is then employed to investigate the impli-
cations of complicated allocation and deployment tactics. The simula-
tion model works in the following way: 
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Incidents are generated throughout the city, randomly in time and 
space. Each incident has an associated priority number, the lowest 
numbers designating the more important incidents. As each incident 
becomes known, an attempt is made to assign (dispatch) a patrol unit 
to the scene of the incident. In certain cases this assignment can-
not be performed because the congestion level of the force 1S too 
high; then, the incident report joins a queue of waiting reports. 
The queue is depleted as patrol units become avai1ab1e. 40 
Larson's use of random patrol positioning is based on the assump-
tion that random crime occurrences are evenly distributed over a given 
rectangular sector, and that the position of the patrol unit and inci-
dent of the call are independent. His expected travel time E(Tr) to 
the call is: 
E(Tr) = 1/3 r~ + rn] 
Lvx vy 
where: E (Tr) = travel time 
Xo = width of sector 
Yo = length of sector 
Vx = effective travel speed to the east-west direction 
Vy = effective travel speed to the north-south direction41 
Thus, Larson's program is similar to LEMRAS, except that more than 
three priority levels are permitted and an average length of time a call in 
each priority level will wait in queue is calculated. 
, There are two major advances over LEMRAS that Larson's model ppro-
poses. First, the program is very flexible to accommodate almost any set 
of priorities and/or dispatching policies. Second, the simulation model is 
based on an algorithm which considers a number of performance measures 
other than just queuing delays. Larson discussed a variety of performance 
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measures that could be considered, but the actual ones included in his pro-
gram were: 
• Average travel time to incident 
• Average patrol frequency (how often a car passes a random point 
in the precinct while on preventative patrol) 
• Patrol hours outside of elapsed time or "preventive" patrol time42 
At first glance, Larson's model can be viewed as a major step in allo-
cation design. Since the simulation technique is extremely flexible, out-
puts on a variety of interests may be obtained, including policy and man-
agement issues. However, in exploring the program in closer detail, 
several fundamental weaknesses are observed. 
Larson bases his simulation and travel time models on the assumptions 
that (a) crime occurs randomly, (b) the probability of space-time coinci-
dence of crime and patrol is a quantifiable and influencing value, and (c) 
crime occurrence and patrol are independent. Unfortunately, these assump-
tions are rarely met. Proponents of crime specific analytic techniques 
argue convincingly that crime does not occur randomly.43 Additionally, 
it has been shown by directed patrol techniques that the position of a 
patrol unit and incident of a call are not independent. 44 Consider the 
recent initiatives of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administratlon regard-
ing patrol research. These studies, to include the Patrol Emphasis Program 
(PEP), the Integrated Criminal Apprephension Program (ICAP), and Managing 
Patrol Operations (MPO), support the theoretical argument that crime does 
not occur randomly; that it follows specific patterns and trends which can 
be plotted. 45 Hence, the crime analysis techniques for directed patrol, 
saturation patrol, task forces, 
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etc. Capturing the essence of crime analysis and the fundamental argument 
that crime does not occur randomly, William G. Gay writes: 
Crime analysis is the process of systematically examining recent 
crime incidents and criminal behavior in an effort to identify 
crime patterns and characteristics so as to permit the effective 
deployment of personnel and resources and the adoption of appro-
priate strategies and tactics. 46 
Another distressing point in Larson's model is his emphasis on 
gaming theory. Being one of the first mathematical models to propose 
the prevention of crime through uniform patrol, he equates the 
probability of detering or intercepting a crime in progress to the 
probability of a crime occurring. This concept necessarily implies 
that preventive patrol is directly proportional to the frequency of 
crime occurrence, an assumption that is not clearly demonstrated. For 
example, Richard Krouger's study on randomly moving patrol cars in 
Houston, Texas, suggests that the probability of a police unit deter-
ring a criminal act, given a specific location, is significantly 
reduced when compared to the same police unit remaining in a 
stationary position. 47 Then too, the controversial study conducted 
in Kansas City in 1975 concluded that regular patrol of the streets by 
uniform police in marked vehicles may not prevent crime. 48 It is 
interesting to note, that Larson responded to the Kansas City experi-
ment; again attempting to employ "probabi1istic models ••• to 
estimate frequencies of preventative patrols and response times. 1I49 
His critique was severely damaged by his use of faulty assumptions 
(previously mentioned). Tony Pate, George L. Kelling, and Charles 
Brown emphasize this point when they write, "Larson's models nor his 
data are adequate to make statements about typical patrol intensities. 
in major American cities. IISO They base this strong statement on a 
lengthy dissertation concerning the criticism of Larson's travel time 
model and simulation-probability model. 
In conclusion, since Larson's program is similar to LEMRAS, it 
requires the continual updating of environmental, community, and 
departmental factors to assess predictive trends. A procedure which 
may be very costly and time consuming. 
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PCAM - Patrol Car Allocation Method. The patrol car allocation 
method (PCAM) is a computer program designed to enable police depart-
ments to determine the number of patrol units to have on duty during 
various times of the day. It is based heavily on Larson's program, 
with substantial improvements. The program was developed jointly by 
the United States Department of Justice and Housing and Urban Develop-
ment in 1975. Its capabilities are described in the users manual by 
Jan Chaiken and Peter Dormant. 5l 
PCAM is a simple analytic model. It provides two patrol per-
formance objectives--dispatch delay and response time. For this 
reason, it is frequently referred to as a performance-oriented system. 
peAM is significantly different from previous programs in that it 
does not attempt to equalize the calls for service workload across 
watches or shifts. Instead, its goal is to deploy officers so that 
dispatch delays and response times (performance monitors) can be 
optimized. PCAM has both descriptive and prescriptive capabilities. 
It is very flexible and can specify particular allocations that best 
meet the standards of performance established by individual users. 
When operated descriptively, an evaluation of current patrol alloca-
tion can be assessed against the user-set performance indicators. 
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When operated prescriptively, the program will recommend the "best" 
temporal allocation of existing resources. The "best" allocation plan 
can be defined by setting parameters for geographical commands, dif-
ferent times of the day or week, average number of calls placed in 
queue, and the total dispatch and response times. 
Unlike the simulation model proposed by Larson, PCAM is not based 
on a randomly-moving patrol car assumption, nor does it hold constant 
specific probability and gaming functions. It is almost entirely con-
trolled by user input and user designation of performance monitors. 
The natural limitation is contained in the number and type of para-
meters available. For instance, the model reflects no geographical 
structure and is insensitive to the locations of patrol cars within a 
specific area. Also, differences in crime rates, call for service 
trends, and patrol densities are not easily augmented to the program. 
For this reason, continual updating requires the user to write sub-
sidiary computer programs; a costly and time-consuming procedure. 
Further, PCAM maintains a simple dispatching model and is severely 
limited to policies and guidelines which can be implemented. As an 
example, PCAM fails to allow dispatching patrol cars across command 
boundaries for high-priority calls. 52 A procedure which is quite 
common and many times imperative in police deployment plans. 
, The Shoup-Dosser Model - The Split Force Concept. Stemming once 
again from the President's Commission on Crime and Law Enforcement in 
1967, the Chicago Police Department, under the leadership of O. W. 
Wilson, received an operations research grant to review uses of man-
power in the patrol division. The result was an exhaustive project in 
the Chicago Police Department which demonstrated the relevance and 
potential value of a number of specific approaches. 53 The two 
models proposed for the allocation of police resources and, that are 
relevant to this study, involve the Shoup-Dosser model with the 
Split-Force concept. 
The principal author of this approach is Albert Bottoms, who 
directed the Operations Research Task Force of the Chicago Police 
Department. 
The Shoup-Dosser model was first proposed in 1964 by Carl S. 
Shoup and Douglas Dosser. 54 The model assumes that the city is 
divided into two districts with corresponding average crime rates Zl 
and Z2. Further, it is assumed that the effectiveness of a patrol-
man is different in each district and that constant numbers Kl and 
K2 are defined to accommodate these differences. If t policeman are 
aSSigned to district one, they will have effectiveness t Kl • The 
larger t Kl , the greater the effectiveness of the t policeman in 
police district one. The goal of police allocation is assumed to 
increase the effectiveness of t Kl • Further, it is assumed that 
when t policeman are aSSigned to district one, the average crime rate 
is reduced to Zl/t Kl. Thus, the total average rate (under the 
two district assumptions) for the city is: 55 
Zl Z2 
-+---
t K1 (T-t)K2 
where: T represents a total number of patrolmen 
Zl and Z2 represent average crime rates 
K1 and K2 represent effectiveness in two police 
districts 
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t represents number of policemen assigned to each district 
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Of course, a much more refined and complicated model is produced 
by Bottoms to distribute T policemen over a city with many police dis-
tricts. However, for the purposes of this study, the simpler equation 
is adequate to explain the model. 
Assuming that police officers have a quantifiable and direct 
affect on the crime rate within a specific district, the model pro-
poses a split-force concept. The ideal objective is to have (at any 
given moment) the exact amount of response force needed to match the 
demand for police service; and simultaneously have a preventive force 
throughout the city in such a way as to minimize total criminal 
activity.56 Thus, the patrol force is split into response and pre-
ventive duties. 
The Chicago experience with the Shoup-Dosser Method can be highly 
criticized on a number of theoretical pOints. Several assumptions are 
made which are not clearly proven. First, the assumption that pre-
ventive uniform patrol has an effect on crime is speculative at best. 
The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, as well as other recent 
studies, indicate that uniform patrol may not alter crime activity in 
a given district. 57 In furtherance of this issue, the Shoup-Dosser 
model proposes that an increase in patrol capability alone directly 
decreases crime. Once again, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol 
Experiment challenges this contention. 58 However, the largest fault 
in the model centers around the division of a city into separate dis-
tricts wherein police productivity is measured in terms of arrests and 
the recovery of stolen property.59 The model assumes that patrolmen 
are equal in performing this productivity measure and, therefore, 
"equal in effectiveness from man to man."60 This 
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assertion is not founded in the literature. Contrarily, a number of 
studies suggest that police behavior, as measured by either clearance 
rates or arrest rates affect the crime rate independent of other 
social factors. In 1974, Tittle and Rowe found that the higher the 
clearance rate the lower the total index crime rate. 61 While this 
study was conducted only among cities and counties in Florida, it 
certainly indicated that individual police style may effect crime. In 
support of this study, Charles Logan analyzed the relationship between 
clearance rates and reported property crimes for five consecutive 
years. He concluded that an inverse relationship existed. 62 And 
finally, in a more comprehensive and detailed study, James Q. Wilson 
and Barbara Boland investigated the effect of police practices on the 
rate of robbery in 35 American cities. 63 They concluded that 
statistical evidence supported the premise that individual police 
behavior may affect crime rates. They state that "police may affect 
crime rates less by how many of them are on patrol than by what they 
do there. 64 This is in direct conflict with the Shoup-Dosser model 
which asserts that a direct increase in t policeman will result in a 
reduction of the average crime rate. 65 
The Hypercube Queuing Model. The hypercube queuing model is one 
of the latest and most advanced computer programs currently used in 
police deployment tDday. Developed in 1975 by Richard Larsen, it 
provides police managers with assistance in the design of individual 
patrol beats. 66 The goal of the program is to provide information 
about the ability of a patrol unit to answer service calls in various 
patrol beats. Unlike traditional beat concepts where patrol units 
answer calls only in assigned areas (except for emergencies), the 
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hypercube design explores different aspects of dispatching strategy. 
The program does not construct beat boundaries. Rather, it calculates 
performance measures for various beat designs and, constructs hypo-
thetical structures which match departmental parameters or needs. The 
model is currently in use in Boston, Massachusetts. 
The hypercube 'program is not a simulation. It solves a set of 
specific queuing equations that determine the steady-state probability 
that any particular set of patrol cars is unavailable to be dis-
patched, while other units are availab1e. 67 In effect, the model 
solves a finite set of equations based on the numerous possibilities 
of different patrol units being unavailable for service c;.lls. 
Further, the program determines a number of outputs based upon these 
probability approximations, such as (1) equal workload among units, 
(2) equal response times and travel times among units, (3) minimum 
dispatches outside a beat, and (4) patrol frequency within each beat. 
Obviously, a prerequisite to the use of hypercube modeling is a 
jurisdiction which is divided into numerous reporting units. 
The hypercube queuing model has a sound conceptual and mathe-
matical base. As previously stated, it is not a simulation model but 
produces calculations which are steadystate. This quality does 
initiate a few drawbacks. First, the number of patrol cars must be a 
fixed and constant number for each run of the program. Second, the 
program is limited in addressing emergency and high priority calls for 
service as the total number of units available at any given period of 
time changes with reported activity. And third, being in a steady-
state, the hypercube model cannot reflect changes in call rates, 
environmental factors, and other characteristics over time without 
being reprogrammed. This updating feature can be costly and time 
consuming. 
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Deployment Plans in General. The preceeding overview has 
attempted to familiarize the reader with an historical evolvement of 
police patrol allocation models. No claim is made that all of the 
published allocation designs have been scrutinized. In fact, only 
those studies and models which are well known and frequently cited 
have been analyzed. There are numerous other designs which are rarely 
mentioned in the literature. For example, the St. Louis model has 
initiated a spatially distributed queuing model; the methods proposed 
by Larson have been segmented into an interactive approach and several 
other probability methods; and the hypercube design has even been 
altered into a program called "superbent."68 For the most part, 
these other models have not been extensively used nor cited in the 
literature. For this reason they are placed in a footnote for the 
purposes of this study. 
One of the pronounced shortcomings of police patrol allocation 
designs, in general, lies in the area of evaluation. For the most 
part, the evaluation of patrol deployment plans have not been well 
developed and have failed to make use of experimental design. 69 
What is required to further the advancement of patrol deployment is a 
carefully designed experiment that measures the effect of innovations 
in police strategies and schemes. For example, very few of the noted 
patrol allocation designs have even been implemented to measure what 
the police actually did. 70 Instead, they attempted to measure the 
effect of increased or decreased response times, elapsed times, police 
presence, workload, calls for service, etc. Further, it is only 
recently that scientists are reviewing and critiquing patrol alloca-
tion plans based on the problems of what policemen actually do. Gary 
W. Cordner offers an excellent advance in this direction as he 
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explores police patrol workload studies from an analysis of the police 
role. 7l He identified a major shortcoming of the workload studies 
based on the ambiguous nature of the patrol task. Not only do police 
spend about 50 percent of their time on free patrol (which is usually 
ignored by allocation studies), but the effect of this free patrol as 
a preventive measure is rarely discussed in terms of self-initiated 
activity.72 The writer agrees with Wilson, Boland, Cordner, and 
others who suggest future patrol allocation designs focus on the "sub-
jective meanings" of patrol activities and the "capabi1ity of 
individual police behavior." 73 
Statement of the Problem 
The state-of-the-art in patrol deployment design has progressed 
in a step-by-step manner. First, utilizing command discretion, 
intuitive judgment, and rather simple analytic techniques in the early 
1950's; to more advanced procedures using computer applications in the 
late 1960's; to finally the total use of computer programming, 
probability modeling, and beat designing in the late 1970's. Through-
out this evolution of allocation models, there has been a consistent 
set of limitations when applied to the needs of small urban centers. 
First, the noted allocation designs have not addressed the issues 
of small cities. They have historically been designed for large urban 
centers, such as Los Angeles (hazard formula), St. Louis (LEMRAS), 
Chicago (Shoup-Dosser), and Boston (hypercube queuing). These highly 
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techn~cal and computerized mathematical models have failed to address 
the special needs of managing police in small urban centers--political 
jurisdictions that account for 93 percent of the police departments in 
the United States. 74 For example, small urban cities are often 
characterized by unique local conditions such as cultural norms 
exhibited in the South; or public expectations of political leaders 
and government institutions; or particular economic capabilities of 
wealthy suburban centers in the East. 75 This often means specific 
idiosyncrasies for each small community t~at must be addressed in the 
police allocation design. For instance, the police may provide 
funeral escort service for their community. Although this might not 
be a high priority service for patrol deployment, nevertheless, it can 
be an important element for decision-making in that jurisdiction. 
Failing to perform this service adequately might have negative 
political and economic consequences when the police manager makes 
budget requests. In contrast, for the large metropolitan city, such a 
service is usually not an issue. 
Secondly, this lack of attention to unique local conditions 
inhibits the use of current programming-type allocation models, such 
as LEMRAS, simulation, PCAM, and hypercube queuing. A documented dis-
advantage to each of these models is the failure of the program to 
readily adapt to a changing environment. A new city policy, a sharp 
economic decline, a quick political turnover, or even a timely police 
raid could drastically alter the predictive functions and workload 
assessments of these sophisticated allocation models. Therefore, con-
tinual evaluating and updating of the program is required. Many 
times, this task is very difficult as subsidiary programs must be 
written. Then too, the community is always changing, causing 
different demands, and affecting current workload patterns. 76 
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This issue is related to still another problem. While the recent 
literature advances computerization as an affordable item for small 
cities, there is a critical limit to the expense of operating such a 
resource. 77 Surely, the continual monitoring and adapting of 
various programs to environmental changes may exceed such a limit. 
And then again, due consideration must be given to not only the 
monetary output but also to the exhaustive time consumption needed to 
fulfill such demands. Given these costs, it can be strongly argued 
that such computer deployment techniques for urban police forces of 
less than 150 sworn persons ;s not economical and may be dysfunc-
tiona1. 78 The continued input of highly technical data for queuing 
and probability models may be too sophisticated and too expensive for 
the manpower deployment needs of small urban police departments. 
Further, most small urban police administrators have not been 
trained to think in terms of probability factors, queuing models, or 
computer simulation techniques. Often the progeny of 20 years 
longevity within a civil service system and having little formal 
education, the small city police manager frequently views these 
allocation designs as too complex and largely irrelevant to his needs. 
, Finally, the large urban police allocation designs have not been 
comprehensive; centering only on the deployment of uniform patrol 
without adequately considering the allocation of personnel to other 
police duties (i.e. investigation, supervision, etc.). The fiscal 
restraints faced by most small urban police departments require 
deployment models that consider the effective and efficient use of all 
field officers. 
Thus, the current available manpower allocation models have not 
met the specific needs of small urban centers on several points. 
These are: (1) the designs are too complicated and require costly 
updating needs; (2) they are not comprehensive; (3) they fail to 
accommodate unique and changing community conditions; and (4) the 
allocation models do not address the local, decision-making elements 
present in small cities. 
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This dissertation addresses this important problem by developing 
a decision-making method for the determination of optimum police 
patrol allocation design for urban centers having less than 100,000 
population. This method will not emphasize prediction of calls for 
service or probability calculations to determining patrol strength 
given certain criteria. The deficiencies of these mathematical models 
have already been discussed. Rather, the focus of this study is on a 
method for combining decision-making elements that will permit a 
police manager to select and use certain criteria to equalize the 
workload of patrol units and to assess alternative methods for 
achieving optimum allocation design. 
In addition to this practical contribution to the science of 
police management, this study has theoretical implications regarding 
the decision-making process in police organizations. By directly 
applying decision-making theory to the "real-world" problem of police 
manpower allocation, a new and innovative managerial technique will be 
proposed. This also will serve as a source to direct inquiry for 
future study. 
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Review of the Literature 
The literature dealing with decision-making in the police manage-
ment field is not extensive, and most of it devoted to methods of 
applying the decision-making process. While in theory it should be 
easy to divide decision-making processes into discrete, conceptual 
paradigms, in reality, it is extremely difficult to separate one 
approach from another. 
Further, there are as many definitions of decision-making as 
there are organizational theorists in the various disciplines. To 
overcome this difficulty, a definition of decision-making has been 
chosen from the many that have been formulated that permits decision-
making to be viewed as a dynamic and complicated process. That 
definition, offered by Ira Sharkansky, is: "a process in which 
choices of alternative courses of action" shape a desired out-
come. 79 It contains several concepts that are directly related to 
the general study of police management and the making of such specific 
decisions as patrol allocation: (1) decision-making is a process; (2) 
decision-making involves the ability to make rational choices; ~3) 
decision-making assumes a systematic methodology; and 
(4) decision-making is conducted by human beings attempting to achieve 
a desired consequence or result. These concepts (which are presented 
in their general order of historical evolvement) provide an analytical 
approach to reviewing the literature. 
Decision-Making as a Process. Sam Sourya1 has identified a 
pattern that he calls lithe microdynamics of decision-making. 1I80 
Accurately displaying decision-making as a purposeful process which 
requires intentional thinking, Souryal places extreme importance on 
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three sub-systems: desireability, predictability, and probability. 
Drawing the essence of his approach from Irwin Bross' design on 
integrating past data with future outcomes, Souryal expresses that his 
microdynamic model is the most useful in the absence of a mathematical 
model; and he assumes that no mathematical model exists. 8l However, 
this conflicts with probability models and simulation methods used in 
operations research and by systems science (discussed later in this 
chapter). Even Bross' study is a structural model providing some 
technical data for administrators. 82 
While Souryal uses a contemporary policy analysis approach to 
develop a continuous process capable of providing the manager with 
insight into future outcomes, he fails to elaborate on the technology 
necessary for useful predictions. From a strict policy analysis view-
point, the process of decision-making should be concerned with 
describing historical patterns, explaining them, ~r.d developing recom-
mendations as to which patterns are desirable and how they might best 
be achieved. Further, and closely related to Souryal's predictive 
approach, a decision-making method should be an intellectual response 
that explains and describes the causes and consequences of administra-
tive action with a heavy emphasis on the exploration and discovery of 
new, innovative alternatives to solutions. These are not new con-
cepts; Yehezkel Dror has been discussing policy-making and decision-
making from a prescriptive point since the 1950's. 83 
However, in support of Souryal's and Bross' concepts, a refresh-
ing underlying theme emerges from the continual dialogue on "predic-
tive techniques." While not openly stated, the models intimate that 
decision-making is more than just following the numbers of plugging 
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values into some mysterious, predictive formula. Decision-making is 
not only a cognitive process, it is an art. And as so eloquently 
described by Aaron Wildavsky, decision-making, like policy analysis is 
an imagination, a "thought experiment" that attempts to recognize 
future contingencies in order to improve what may come to pass. 84 
Futher, decision-making is prognostic. Inherent in the process is the 
ability to perceive future consequences of actions taken. 8S 
Here then, is the essence of decision-making as a process; as a 
continuous, dynamic, imaginative and intuitive procedure aimed at 
understanding historical patterns, grasping current situations, 
recognizing decision consequences, and perceiving future events. 
Decision-making and Rational Choices. Considered the most 
idealistic design developed in the area of decision-making, the 
rational or normative model concentrates on the individual ability to 
reason or compare alternative means to an end. 
Herbert Simon explains that rational choices are made on a 
"principle of efficiency.,,86 His famous model of rationality con-
tends that there are three essential steps in decision-making; (1) 
list all of the alternative strategies, (2) determine and calculate 
all of the consequences to each strategy, and (3) evaluate all of 
these consequences in a comparative fashion. 87 While Simon is given 
cre~it to the development of this approach, its comprehensive 
expansion can be observed in the literature of several other 
well-known theorists. Peter Drucker's concept of the "Effective 
Executive," N.F. Iannone's "style" in Supervision of Police Personnel, 
and Sharkansky's development of Public Administration all exhibit an 
expansion on SimonIs original work. 88 The rational model, now often 
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referred to as the rational-comprehensive model in the above standard 
works, sets forth a series of formalized steps toward "effective il 
decision-making. These steps can be generally observed in each of the 
cited studies and listed as follows: 
1. Identify and define the problem 
2. Ascertain all information regarding the problem 
3. List all possible alternatives and means to solving the problem 
4. Analyze the alternatives and assess the facts 
5. Select the appropriate alternatives; find the answer. 
It is obvious to observe the elaboration on Simon's original 
method in each of these cases. The decision-making approach assumes an 
ideal condition whereby the decision-maker is aware of all available 
information related to the problem and has an unlimited amount of time 
in which to explore and narrow down proposed alternatives by a 
"rational" and comparative process. Unfortunately, the real world 
rarely allows for the ideal. 
Therefore, highly criticized for being too idealistic and irrele-
vant to the administrative functions of a police organization, the 
rational decision-making model has been subjected to harsh theoretical 
reviews. Interestingly, many of these criticisms were noted as 
limitations by the proponent in the original method. For instance, 
Sha~kansky provided a detailed discussion of "road blocks" to the 
fulfillment of the rational-comprehensive model in practical adminis-
tration. 89 He documented constraints in the collection of all avail-
able data and emphasized contingencies in the human ability to make 
decisions. Additionally, Simon elaborated on the concept of a 
"rational man." Noting that man was "bounded" by a triangle of limita-
tions, he stated: 
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On one side, the individual is limited by those skills, habits, and 
reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the conscious ••• on 
a second side, the individual is limited by his values and those 
conceptions of purpose which influence him in making decisions ••• 
and on a third side, the individual is limited by the extent of his 
knowledge that is relevant to his job. 90 
It is apparent that Simon not only understood the decision-making 
process but also the "human" factors associated in the term 
"rationality." A prerequisite to "effective" decision-making is an 
acute awareness of the social, environmental, and organizational 
demands placed on the administrator. Simon accurately stresses that 
man's ability to make rational decisions is bounded by the limitation 
of his knowledge of the total organization. 9l From this critical 
observation, he formulates a modified rational-comprehensive idea 
entitled, "bounded rationality.,,92 The emphasis, of course, is on 
man's inherent limitations to make decisions. 
Another approach concerning the modification of rational decision-
making is "incremental" and "muddling through" theories explored by 
Charles Lindblom. 93 Based on his study of governmental institutions 
in the United States, Lindblom states that the decision-making process 
is so fragmented and so complex, incorporating the interaction of 
various institutions, political entities, pressure groups, and 
individual biases that rationality can have only a marginal or "incre-
mental" affect. Lindblom asserts that decision-making is serial, that 
it is limited by time and resources, as it gropes along a path where 
means and ends are not distinct, where goals and objectives are 
ambiguous, and where rationality serves no purpose. Contending that 
managers and administrators "play things safe" and opt to move very 
slowly (incrementally) in decision-making, Lindblom proposes that 
managers "muddle through" problems rather than analytically choose 
decisions. 94 Lindblom's ideas have support, if not in theory, at 
least in practice, as many police managers find them to be "a descrip-
tion of rea1ity."95 
Thus, the decision-making method has been proposed by Simon and 
others, and to some extent even Lindblom, to be a process of choice 
based on a rational comparison of alternatives. Highly criticized for 
being too ideal, they ironically provide the basic theoretical founda-
tions for the third set of models to be studied--those involving a 
systemic approach to alternative measures. 
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Decision-making Assumes a Systematic Methodology. Introduced in 
the early 1950's as "general systems theory" by Ludwig Von Berta1anffy, 
his model emphasizes a system which maintains a constant state while 
the surrounding environment is changing (so-called dynamic equilib-
rium).96 Using any living organism as an example, Bertalanffy's 
concept is based on "organization and wholeness" in the accomplishment 
of a number of goa1s. 97 The important aspect of the early systems 
approach is that it conceptualizes a system as a static entity. In 
this sense, an "organism" or an organization is t'epresented as a 
self-maintaining structure, one which can reproduce. Such an analysis 
hints at the type of framework useful as a systems theory for 
decision-making one which is developed as a system of systems and that 
can focus attention at the proper points in the organization for 
rational maneuvering, both from the standpoint of the organization and 
the environment. 
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Anthony Wilden provides an exceptional categorization of the 
systems approach in which the non-developmental, structure maintaining, 
and consistent system is labeled "homeostatic."98 Wilden's typo-
graphic label implies a sequential stepping of events between organiza-
tion and environment in which change occurs linearly and independently. 
The scientific-management movement of the early 1960's utilized 
the concept of the man-machine system (cybernetics) to re-emphasize the 
organization and the environment as separate distinctions, dependent on 
a static interplay for goal achievement. It was not until Magorah 
Maruyama's classic call for a second cybernetics, in 1963, that the 
concept of "mutuality" was introduced. 99 His profound idea initiated 
an alterating interaction between organization and environment, or an 
action/reaction exchange. It was at this point that the concept of 
system with environment versus system in environment became 
apparent. 100 
This conceptual change resulted in a relatively widespread 
re-evaluation of managerial approaches and decision-making techniques. 
Recognizing the ideal organization must act "in harmony" with the 
environment, proponents such as Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn shifted the 
focus of system science to the organization as an open-ended, social 
sub-system. 101 The concept studied the organization from within, as 
a social device for efficiently accomplishing, through group means, 
some stated purpose. Hence, the social-system school evolved from two 
independent participants (the organization and the environment), to the 
study of interpersonal relationships, human b2havior, and informal/ 
formal patterns of organization within an environment. Moreover, this 
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organization or enterprise was recognized as subject to external 
pressures from the cultural, economic, social, political, and 
physiological surroundings. In effect, the theoretical concerns of the 
systems approach asserted that any organization could be studied as a 
distinct subsystem, within the social structure of society, having a 
specific function and objective. 102 
Relating this approach to law enforcement agencies, the police 
system can be viewed as a part of an integral set of components that 
work together for an overall goa1. 103 It is a part of a larger 
environmental system. 
In this sense, the systems approach is similar to the rational 
model previously described as they both contend: 
1. There is a lack of agreement regarding the objectives of the 
police system (especially concerning manpower allocation). 
2. There is a lack of knowledge of alternative means for accom-
plishing goals, either within or outside the system. 
3. There is a lack of agreement defining the criteria of perfor-
mance, and; 
4. There is a lack of knowedge of transfer functions which would 
enable the prediction of outcomes from any given set of 
inputs. 104 
Basically, the systems approach is a derivative of the rationa1-
comprehensive model. It is a framework for complex problem-solving, 
emphasizing hierarchies of systems and their inter-relationships. For 
the most part, the systems method attempts to define objectives and 
give some sense of order or structure to the solving of problems aimed 
at accomplishing those objectives. 
A system can be defined as a set of objects and all the relation-
ships that exist between the objects. All systems are composed of 
sub-systems and are members of a higher system. 105 For example, the 
police system is in part, a member of the criminal justice system, 
which is a part of the social system of America within which our 
societies exist. The police system, in turn, is a set of sub-systems. 
Following World War II, the systems approach segmented into a 
technique vastly influenced by large, complex systems of variables. 
The application, collection, and analysis of data for decision-making 
within the organization was called "operations research."106 In 
response to a need for a management-science which addressed complex 
problems involving many variables, such as government planning, 
military spending, natural resource conservation, and national defense 
budgeting, operations research employed the use of mathematical 
inquiry, probability theory, and gaming theory to "calculate the 
probable consequences of alternative choices" in decision-
making. 107 As a result, techniques such as Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique (PERT) and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS) were developed for use in managerial planning, 
forecasting, and decision-making. 108 By their very nature, these 
techniques must structure the system for analysis by quantifying 
system elements. This process of abstraction often simplifies the 
problem and takes it out of the real world. Hence, the solution of 
the problem may not be applicable in the actual situation. 
PERT and PPBS are managerial attempts to convert the disorganized 
resources of men, machines, and money into a useful and effective 
enterprise by which alternatives to problem-solving can be assessed. 
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This process is conducted by a cost-effective analysis or an estima-
tion for each alternative of the costs that would be incurred and the 
extent to which the objectives would be attained. 
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This approach is again, a highly sophisticated elaboration of the 
rational model utilizing quantitative techniques in the cost-effective 
relationship. The weakness of the method is in its practicality to 
real world situations where time and resources are not directly 
structured to gather intelligence about every problem and possible 
alternative. Further, it also assumes that human biases will not 
enter the decision-making process. The most critical aspect of the 
approach appears to be in its overriding insistance that decision-
making is not a human activity but the product of some scientific, 
computerized and unimpressionable robot that digests quantitative 
information in return for "calculated responses. 1I 
Aaron Wildavsky has continually warned that the application of 
decision-making to costs, benefits, resources, and budgets frequently 
formulates the adoption of meaningless data and places an unwarranted 
stimuli into the process. 109 The danger may be that decision-making 
might decrease its intellectual content at the expense of practical 
impact. 
The last decade has produced a significant change in the systems 
approach to management and decision-making. Stemming from the human 
relations concept, the new systems literature centers on explaining 
both the behavior of organizations and the behavior of people within 
organizations amid a changing environment. The shift from large, com-
plex organizations and systems to small groups is noted in the 
plethora of studies aimed at improving managerial style and tech-
nique. Sensitivity training, interaction modeling, leadership 
profiiing, group dynamics, communicJtion workshops, motivation 
therapy, and job satisfaction studies are all relatively recent con-
tributions to this body of knowledge. The goal of this human 
relations perspective is to harmonize the organization with the 
objective and methods of managerial decision-making. Hence, the 
application of theories and perspectives advanced by Etzioni, Likert, 
MacGregor, Drucker, Argyris, Odiorne, Shein, and Katzell address 
managerial and decision-making behavior within the organization. 110 
Although these bodies of knowledge are worthwhile contributions, they 
have not provided a lasting solution to the continuing disparity 
between satisfaction and acceptable organizational experiences on the 
one hand and rapidly changing environmental conditions on the other. 
Today's managers and decision-makers must attempt to balance these 
internal and external conditions. Warren Bennis captures this thought 
in his work on adapting to change. lll 
This tenuous concept of the "organization in a state of ferment" 
has led to a new level of decision-making ability--the concept of 
learning through environmental evolution. 112 The literature in this 
area lends itself to the planning process as described in Gregory 
Bateson's work. 113 He formulates a series of developmental steps in 
which the process of change is adapted to through individual learn-
ing. Edgar Dunn takes this concept of learning by evolution and moves 
beyond the individual and organization to the overall system. 114 
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Implying a much higher degree of complexity to his model, Dunn states 
that learning through change is not linear or serial. Instead, he 
proposes that new behavior, new structure, new rules, and subsequently 
new conditions arise from pre-existing ones through a process of 
transformation. 115 The important element of Dunn's model can be 
seen in its comparison to earlier systems approaches. Dunn's "trans-
formation" concept emphasizes that systems are not static (as compared 
to Wilden's classification of homeostatis and sequential stepping of 
events). According to Dunn, the organization and the individual 
survive by their ability to adapt and evolve within the social 
system. Learning is inventive and creative on the part of human 
beings; it is a cognitive ability for modifying present conditions 
under changing circumstances. 116 
This concept is elaborated on by Friedman, Michaels, and Schon 
who contribute to the theoretical argument of social learning by 
focusing on real world examples. 117 Friedman's study on the role of 
the planner in a mutual learning transaction with clients super-
ficially touches the real processes by which organizations, institu-
tions, and societies transform themselves within a changing environ-
ment. Michaels concept of planning and change addresses this issue in 
much more detail. Emphasizing that shifts in social norms and 
structures (as well as technological innovations) require change in 
personal, interpersonal, functional, and managerial aspects of 
organizational life; Michael advocates the implementation of "long-
range social planning."118 From a theoretical pOint, Michael 
expands on Dunn's concept of organizational transformation. Noting 
that social shifts have historically been reactive, unanticipated, and 
uncontrolled, Michael proposes a plan for "directed se1f-
transformation" for the organization and society.119 Michael views 
his learning process as a societal movement toward learning how to 
adapt to change. 120 Basically, he proposes a reciprocal concept 
between organizational and environmental learning. The organization 
learns how to change with the environment as the environment is 
adapted to accommodate the organizational change. Through mutual 
feedback, in times of uncertainty and turbulence, Michaels stresses 
that change in structure and norms can occur "so as to make the con-
sequences rewarding" for both the environment and the organiza-
tion. 121 
Donald Schon argues that the organization must become "a learning 
system" decentralizing control and abandoning pragmatic models of 
p1anning. 122 Contending that institutions and organizations respond 
to the threat of change by stagnate reluctance or "dynamic conser-
vatism," he proposes that strategic learning, intervention, and fore-
casting be employed so that necessary action can be taken to allow for 
future contingencies. 123 Schon views the world as a dynamic, tur-
bulent environment threatening public and governmental institutions 
who refuse to change. His solution is not in adaptation, like 
Michael, but is based on the structural change of institutions to 
define themselves in terms of "functional systems."124 In this 
manner, specificity is lost and the linking of previously separated 
components is achieved, thereby, producing new "networks."125 It is 
under the pressures of change that these "networks" are forced to rely 
on each other and subsequently become learning systems to facilitate 
the decision-making process. 
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Although criticized for being unsubstantive and failing to 
address a specific and qualitative goal in future planning; the works 
of Friedman, Michael, and Schon offer a different perspective to the 
traditional systems approach to decision-making. They establish new 
vistas which involve the individual as a integral part of the organi-
zation to cope with change. It is the emphasis on the individual 
which highlights the final point in this literature review. 
Decision-making is a Human Attempt to Attain Goals. In an 
opposing concept to rationality and logic, William Gore identifies the 
crucial element of humanism in decision-making. He presents a 
"heuristic model" appropriately referred to as lithe gut level 
approach" when considering the police organization. 126 The seasoned 
patrol officer frequently refers to an unknown quality or phenomena 
known as "mocksie" or the ability to be "street-wise." This unknown 
dimension is captured in Gore's decision-making method for 
administrators. In an antithesis to the rational model, Gore provides 
a mechanism by which a decision is the product of the maker's 
personality. In a quotation from his book, Gore views the heuristic 
process lias a groping toward agreements seldom arrived at through 
logic ••• the very essence of those factors validating a decision 
are internal to the personality of the individual instead of external 
to it." 127 While the rational method is concrete, formalized by 
structure and calculations; the heuristic concept is nebulous, charac-
terized by "gut feelings reaching backward into the memory and forward 
into the future." 128 
Applauded for its contribution to the decision-making process, 
Gore's approach is also highly criticized as being too simplistic and 
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non-scientific. Sam Sourya1 writes that "Gore's analysis is too 
unreliable. it could complicate existing situations, promote 
spontaneity, discredit the role of training, and delay the advent of 
professiona1ism" in police organizations. 129 
This is an unfair assessment of the method. Gore views heuristic 
applications as adjuncts or alternatives to rational models. Further, 
some type of credibility must be asessed to that vague, unknown, and 
non-measurable entity we call "experience," "ta1ent," or the "sixth 
sense." It was this element that Simon had so much trouble with in 
calculating his "bound and 1imited" argument regarding the rational 
model. In any event, Gore's contribution remains as a paradoxical 
antinomy to decision-making based solely on figures, formulas, and 
mathematical designs. 
The last decade has seen the emergence of yet another aspect 
toward heuristic decision-making. Research on commisurotomized brain 
patients (those whose brains have been surgically split) has received 
considerable attention in the psychophysiology literature. The issue 
being raised concerns the delineation of brain hemispherical functions 
in relation to intuition. Roger Sperry's experiments infer that there 
are two distinct, information-processing systems respective to each 
brain hemisphere. He states that "there appears to be two modes of 
thinking, verbal and nonverbal, represented rather separately in left 
and right hemispheres, respective1y.1I130 Michael Gazzaniga 
elaborates on this distinction by studying cross-quing and 
interference of one hemisphere to the other. 131 When the right side 
responds to a task unknown by the left and the left is asked why the 
response is made, it often guesses. It needs a reason for 
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behavior--reason does not always direct behavior but reality is 
interpreted and rationalized after the fact based on responses to 
it. 132 Since the right hemisphere does not have language, it is 
suggested that intuition may be the non-verbal knowledge of the right 
promoting acceptance or rejection of the data of the left. 133 What 
is known about the right hemisphere is not conclusive. However, the 
concept that it may derive at an answer to a question from a wider, 
more detailed, and more specific base of information than aware to the 
cognitive functions of an individual is highly conceivable. To the 
area of decision-making, this type of research holds a fascinating key 
to unlocking the door of "gut-level H or "sixth sense" rat~onality. 
Summary. The preceding discussion has reviewed the literature on 
decision-making methods. There appears to be a wide variety of 
concepts and an indefinite opinion as to which approach explains what 
decisions. One of the noted experts on theoretical modeling is Thomas 
Dye. Indicating that the purpose of a model is to explain, clarify, 
or simplify the understanding of a governmental, political, or 
administrative process, he suggests that models and methods are not 
competitive. 134 Therefore, no one idea can be judged "best." Each 
one provides a separate focus on the decision-making process. 
It is the purpose of this study to design a new method for 
decision-making as applied to police patrol allocation. The theore-
tical importance here is that the method to be presented will 
integrate the four identified focal pOints of decision-making: 
1. decision-making is a process (Souryal, Dror, and Wi1davsky) 
2. decision-making involves the ability to make rational choices 
(Simon, Iannone, and Sharkansky) 
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3. decision-making assumes a systematic methodology (Quade, 
Wilden, Nillsson, Dunn, Michael, and Schon) 
4. decision-making is conducted by human beings attempting to 
achieve desired goals (Gore, Sperry, and Gazzaniga) 
For this reason, the review of literature has been confined to a 
general ovs~view, segmented into a categorization which provides an 
easy and uncomplicated manner in which to study decision-making 
models. In the next chapter, the fundamental design and theoretical 
framework of this new decision-making technique will be explained. 
This innovative method marks the major advancement proposed in this 
treatise. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING 
The great advances made since World War II in both the theory and 
practice of organizational behavior have done much to raise the quality 
of managerial decision-making. Unfortunately, most of it has not yet 
been recognized by many police managers. 
In the preceding chapter, four distinct yet related theoretical 
advances were identified decision-making is: (1) a process, (2) a 
rational ability, (3) a systematic methodology, and; (4) a human 
endeavor. The one key element to which each of the different authors 
prescribed is that decision-making is dynamic. It is continually 
changing, and what may be current today will soon be outdated. No-
where is this phenomena more clearly stated than in the writings of 
Alvin Toffler--Future Shock and The Eco-Spasm Report. l Each of these 
works strongly indicate that traditional organizational structures and 
managerial decision-making practices are crumbling under the impact of 
accelerating changes in technology, social values and norms, and the 
amount of knowledge available. 2 These, and many other writings, 
clearly warn students of management techniques to concentrate on 
advanced concepts that attempt to avoid future problems. Just emerging 
as an academic discipline is the study known as "futuristics." Its aim 
is to develop specific planning, forecasting, and control techniques in 
order to cope with future contingencies. 
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Here then, is a major emphasis of an integrated approach to 
decision-making: to be able to survive and adapt to rapid change, to 
be flexible and prescriptive. In order to fulfill such a mission, a 
necessary quality for success must be in the integrative measures taken 
between organization and environment and between theorist and 
practitioner. 
Further, the four theoretical perspectives that have been reviewed 
are in no way contradictory one to another; rather they are mutually 
compatible, with considerable overlap between them. Each theory 
stresses certain aspects of decision-making and neglects others. 
Logically then, an integration of these four considerations should 
present a relatively complete and innovative approach. 
A Decision-Making Model 
The decision-making process does not emerge immediately and 
clearly like a new rose budding in May, but gradually and steadily in 
a growing manner. Similar to Lindblom's "serial" concept of policy-
making, decision-making occurs in a somewhat sequential form. 3 How-
ever, instead of viewing decision-making as a progressive "mudding 
through" concept, it should be analyzed in terms of a specific 
response-action behavior. That is not to say that there are neatly 
detailed, refined and specific steps which are followed in coming to 
choice, but rather, that there are indeed a series of nebulous stages 
which form a behavioral framework to decision-making. These stages 
can be identified and discussed in terms of a response-action behavior. 
Herbert Simon's concept of decision-making built on a principle 
of "phases," or Craig Lundberg's thoughts on decision-making 
I c1asses," or William Gorels projections of "strategic parts," or 
Edmund Quadels uses of "structura1 techniques," were all attempts to 
classify these general "stages" in the decision-making process. 4 
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All are analogous to a set of rather undefined and. loosely connected 
behaviors within the decision-making process. These are: (1) problem 
recognition or awareness, (2) analyzing or doing something with infor-
mation, and (3) formulating a choice. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic view of decision-making as proposed 
by this dissertation. It should be emphasized that each stage does 
not represent a stringently defined and quickly visible step. 
Instead, the decision-making process is viewed as a series of 
response-action stages where clear lines of demarcation are not known 
nor are they relevant to the overall process. The important features 
are the integrated capabilities diagrammed between the environment and 
the organization. 
One of the fundamental problems exhibited in other attempts to 
describe the decision-making process is in exactness. This is 
especially true in many of the systems approaches. There appears to 
be a set of rigid and firm boxes into which and out of which come 
exact issues and answers. Integrated Management Decision-Making 
(IMDM) is a direct attempt to alleviate this persistence. 
Decision-making cannot be viewed as a highly definable process with 
quantifiable inputs and calculable outputs. Instead, it is a very 
ambiguous and vague concept of an organizational behavior. Any 
attempt to measure or quantify the variables associated within this 
problem-solving process is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 5 
Additionally, one of the essential features for futuristic-oriented 
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approaches in decision-making is flexibility. The model must be able 
to mold and conform to different contingencies and exogenous factors 
influencing the outcome. For example, any decision conducted by a 
public organization or administrator must be responsive and cognizant 
of political pressures. In short, most decisions involve a great deal 
of negotiation and persuasion rather than pure rationality. 
Each of the "stages" comprising IMDM can be related to a 
response-action activity. This activity must center on information 
flow between stages, and between the environment and the organiza-
tion. Communication and continual feedback is the backbone of IMDM. 
This model represents a new method for simultaneously increasing 
communication, understanding, development of options, and a course of 
action between the organization and the environment. It is a dual-
involvement perspective characterized by cognitive processes within 
the organization. It necessarily requires the ability to assess 
information, to plan ahead, to learn, and to adapt. These features 
are in contrast to the analytical and instrumental quantification 
approaches proposed in the past. 6 
Integrated Management Decision-Making can be characterized by the 
following practices! (1) It views the organization both as a system 
with its own subsystems and as a subsystem of a larger environmental 
system; (2) it takes a holistic approach, using techniques that empha-
size the interrelationships among component stages; (3) it stresses 
flexibility and changing organizational structures; and (4) it 
attempts to strengthen the human aspect or input within the process. 
The following discussion attempts to focus on each stage of the model, 
highlighting the characteristics and advantages of the overall 
technique. 
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Articulation of the Problem. The concept of accurate and precise 
problem identification has plagued decision-making theorists for some-
time. Recognized as the "beginning phase" for the decision-making 
process by Herbert Simon back in 1960, this critical and initiatory 
stage involves much more than simple "awareness."7 Donald Schon's 
Displacement of Concepts emphasizes this step as a behavior. 8 
Pointing out that people can only describe a problem in the language 
and terms that are understandable in their own respective world, Schon 
characterizes the identification of a problem as a shift in conceptual 
thinking. 9 Linking the problem to "what was once working" and to 
what is now the "beginning" instead of the "old," a problem recogni-
tion involves a specific organizational action to an internal or 
external pressure. 10 Thus, an organization exists in a state of 
suspended animation until some force comes to bear, initiating an 
action from the organization to define a problem in its own language 
and within its own contextual framework. Of course, the inherent 
fault lies in the perception of a problem. What an external or 
internal force conceives to be a problem may indeed be quite different 
from what the organization articulates to be the problem. The major 
crux of what is supposed to be a problem is lost when interpreted from 
the organizational reference. Thus, problem misconception can be con-
stroed as a difference in interpretation based on individual 
references both internal and external to the organization. These mis-
conceptions make problem identification and articulation less valid 
and many times spurious in content. 
C. West Churchman elaborates further on this issue. Indicating 
that we all make an incorrect beginning in viewing problems by 
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describing them "in terms of structure," Churchman advocates a com-
plete change in thinking. 11 Instead of conceptualizing by means of 
description and structure, we should consider function and purpose. 
Perhaps the greatest strengthening for decision-making can come in 
this area. If we think in terms of structure, we naturally limit our-
selves to the capabilities and capacities of our own point of 
reference; we cannot transgress the boundaries of our own, single 
environment, if we only think description. What is needed is to 
emphasize "central objectives;" to plan ahead in terms of specific 
accomplishments. 12 This attention to objectives and strategies 
would help: (1) to keep decision-making consistently focused rather 
than going off in many directions, which often produces failure; (2) 
to ensure that the specific decision techniques are harnessed to serv-
ing a meaningful purpose that are well thought out; (3) to plan for 
future contingencies, problems, and failures; and (4) to reduce 
problem misconception by clearly articulating objectives that are 
operationally clear and universally understood. 
Thus, a shift can be seen as a change from describing a problem 
to stating an objective. It makes no difference what the problem is, 
if we agree on a course of action in response to the demand. For 
example, there exists an economic and political pressure on police 
organization to effectively and efficiently deploy patrol personnel 
within a limited budget. It is irrelevant if different interest 
groups define this as a problem in wasting governmental time and 
money, or a threat to crime control, or a burden to specific city 
locations. The important point lies in defining an objective to meet 
this need; such as allocation through equalized workload. 
66 
Implementation. Once such an objective is discovered, the second 
stage of the decision-making process is entered, that of implementa-
tion. It is critical that the issue of definition be highlighted in 
this process. That is, what exact intentions and events are to be 
accomplished. Pressman and Wildavsky have noted that the act of 
implementation is a process within itself, and that the environmental 
arena of implementation may be so intense that goals and objectives 
become vague, ambiguous, or 10st.13 In other words, implementation, 
often times, accelerates the loss of definition. 
Further, implementation is indeed a process. It can be viewed as 
a complex staging of events within the overall decision-making arena. 
Implementation focuses on the application of an objective to the 
environment. This may require the political or economic or cultural 
maneuvering of numerous and diverse elements, actors, and forces to 
accomplish an end result. The important aspect to consider is that 
implementation both expresses conflict and creates it; and that within 
every movement aimed at reducing a problem, there is an associated 
risk of actually making matters worse. Therefore, implementation does 
not just apply an objective, it produces change. And as Pressman and 
Wildavsky have so eloquently indicated, each step of the implementa-
tion process may "geometrically grow" as other issues or problems or 
crisis are caused. 14 For this reason, organizations must adopt a 
decision-making model that is flexible and able to withstand buffeting 
by a constantly shifting set of environmental factors. Implementation 
involves the ability of an organization to apply an objective to the 
environment. This requires not only flexibility, but also futuristic 
insight; like planning and visualizing future situations, making 
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estimates of what will happen at each step of the process, identifying 
the issues and potential danger points, analyzing the different ways 
and means for reaching desired goals through the least resistive path; 
and initiating action in time to prepare what may be needed to cope 
with changing conditions and contingent events. 
The recent literature concerning implementation indicates that 
many of these same concepts have been identified regarding change and 
complexity within the process. Jan Huyman writes that the extreme 
confusion regarding the meaning of the term implementation necessi-
tates a "provisional working definition."15 Douglas Bunker suggests 
that the key to understanding implementation is to "identify the 
significant interaction points and actors" of the process. 16 Donald 
Van Meter and Carl Van Horn stress further that the critical imp or-
tance within the implementation process is in "calculating the amount 
of change" that will occur. 17 And finally, Eugene Bardack simulates 
the process of implementation to a type of "gamesmanship" in which the 
organization attempts to maneuver elements necessary for accomplishing 
goals and objectives while still surviving in a turbulent and 
uncertain environment. 18 
To this point, implementation has been discussed as causing 
change in the environment. However, it also causes change within the 
organization. Essentially, implementation is a response to an 
action. The purpose of the process is to apply an objective to the 
environment after a specific action (problem) has been defined. What 
needs to be emphasized is that change must concurrently happen in the 
organization to successfully accomplish or carry-out its own 
decision. Thus, implementation causes change in both the environment 
and the organization. 
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Organizational-Environmental Learning. The third transitional 
stage in Integrated Management Decision-Making involves another pro-
cess within itself; that of learning. To this point, the environment 
has not been fully defined from an organizational perspective. It can 
be considered the "independent cluster of persons, groups, organiza-
tions, political parties, and so forth, to which the organization must 
respond. 1I19 The tenuous relationship between organization and 
environment is circular and active. In a sense, this relationship is 
characterized by an organizational action which is absorbed by the 
environment in the assumption that a beneficial change will 
occur. 20 For all practical purposes this exchange of information 
and activity can be described as organization-environmental learning. 
Traditionally, this exchange of information has been assumed to 
be fragmental and sequential. However, the recognition of a systems 
design involving continual exchange of information between the two 
entities of organization and environment explore two main themes: (1) 
learning is a central subject for planning and decision-making, making 
the process "non-linear" (i.e. acting upon structures rather than 
variables of systems) and simultaneous in its general approach; and 
(2) learning is non-deterministic, future-creative, and places 
emphasis on adaptation and invention through forecasting. 21 
The concept of organization-environmental learning as a con-
tinuous and dynamic exchange of information is not new. There is con-
siderable overlap here, with the recent writings of social planners 
such as Friedmann, Jantsch, Friend and Jossop, Kahn, Schon, and 
Michae1. 22 Friedmann expresses this concept best in his essay on 
comprehensive urban planning; "mutua1 learning involves a symbiosis 
(between organization and environment) ••• that should go beyond a 
single interaction and extend to a continual relationship ••• that 
explores alternative futures for decision-making. 23 
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However, this perspective describes the ideal in organization-
environmental learning. All too often, a variety of barriers exist 
which impede this process from being effective or continuous. A dis-
cussion of these restraints and blockades is essential in the study of 
organization-environmental learning. 
First, according to Michael, the assumption of a passively 
responding environment versus an active and dynamic environment led to 
the belief that human relations were "naturally" of a hierarchial 
order. 24 Sociological studies by Weber, Mills, and Marx supported 
this hypothesis. 25 Further, this perspective has been abetted by 
our language structure, which implicitly assign, cause and effect, 
subject and predicate, and thereby implicitly treats social systems as 
if they were "naturally" linear rather than circular in process. 26 
However, if we explore the writings of Warren Bennis and Chris 
Argyris, a much different perspective is argued. 27 Social systems 
are circular. The future, according to Bennis, will be characterized 
by a distribution of power and authority, a separation of management 
from ownership, and an "integration" of organizational goals with 
environmental demands and individual needs. 28 Argyris echoes these 
same observations in his work as he suggests that "any organization 
that is structured in a pyramidal form" will create a social system 
that is indeed impersonal and linear. However, he strongly advocates 
that "interpersonal incompetence" is sustained by these structures of 
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linearity within an organization that is characterized by stagna-
tion. 29 Bennis and Argyris research into the interpersonal-personal 
behavior of organizational life emphasizes that social systems are not 
"naturally" linear but circular, that vertical-horizontal structures 
are functions of bureaucratic strategy, and that human effectiveness 
increases as involvement and dynamic interpersonal growth increases 
between individuals. 3D The point is that organizations, all too 
often, prohibit learning because of their "non-human-oriented" struc-
ture, which facilitates the concept of linear versus circular 
relationships.3l 
Another barrier to organization-environmental learning stems from 
this same structural problem, and involves information flow or com-
munication. Since the processing and analyzing of information is a 
ncessary prerequisite to learning, it seems only natural that the pro-
cesses by which information is transmitted and received be concep-
tually clear and distinct. However, most organizations fail to either 
send or receive such transmissions. The problem can be seen as one of 
perception, confused by structure. This treatise previously discussed 
the inherent problems of misconceptions in communication because of 
reference groups or reference points. However, consider the complica-
tions of preconceived reputations or hidden agendas or lack of trust 
between sender and receiver. These foregoing factors influence the 
arena of communication because of structure. 32 Hierarchial 
relationships within organizations dictate speCific, preconceieved 
assumptions; such as information and "orders" flow from top to bottom 
or from superior to subordinate. Communication involves effective 
receiving as well as sending. Consider an outside interest group 
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attempting to receive information from a bureaucratic establishment. 
What factors effect communication? Surely, attention must be paid to 
the Ic1imate" or the "timing" of the communique to be effective. 32 
Organization-environmental learning is predisposed to effective com-
munication. If communication is considered directional rather than 
interactive, then learning is severely restrained. Both the organiza-
tion and the environment must interact to effectively address the 
issues of change and implementation. 
Identifying the involvement of interdisciplinary approaches in 
social learning, Magorah Maruyama focuses on another issue in communi-
cation. 33 He states that there exists three paradigms among 
planners: one-way causal (hierarchists), random-process (individ-
ualists), and mutual causal (mutualists). These paradigms stem from 
basic philosophical, epistemological, and scientific roots of various 
origins which form the basis of individual perceptions, behavior, and 
views. Analyzing these paradigms from an organization-environmental 
learning perspective, it is easy to understand that these different 
paradigms perceive one another to be illogical, unintelligent and even 
deceptive. Maruyama concludes that communication between the 
paradigms is severely limited, if not impossible. 34 Once again, 
what appears to be differences in references complicates the flow of 
information and hence, retards organization-environmental learning. 
Another of the natural barriers to change is resistance. Robert 
Chin has elaborated on this theme in his analysis of the systems 
model. Reporting that most organizations wish to view themselves as 
stable, existing within a uniform and consistent environment, Chin 
advances his concept of "stationary equilibrium. 1I35 He proposes 
that systems in equilibrium react to external or internal impinge-
ments, disturbances, or changes by refusing to acknowledge their 
existence. Remembering Wilden's classification of homeostatis, Chin 
believes that resistance can be further advanced by simply "bringing 
into operation those forces that restore or re-create a balance."36 
Donald Schon's idea of "dynamic conservatism" is analogous to this 
concept. 37 Describing a world where organizations refuse to change 
or adapt to the dynamic environment, Schon proposes that "systems 
learn to become capable of transforming themselves."38 If they do 
not, then a crisis of disruption or continual conflict occurs between 
organization and environment in which institutions, business firms, 
public establishments, and private enterprises loose personal 
identify, legitimacy, and confidence. The natural result is chaos 
"beyond the stable state. 1I39 
Thus, inherent to the decision-making process, is a stage of 
learning whereby information must freely flow between and within 
organization and environment. This communication of ideas and infor-
mation must transcend those barriers described and essentially 
integrate organizational and environmental change. 
Adaptation. The crucial element of Integrated Management 
Decision-making is indeed integration. It occurs between the stages 
of learning and adaptation, where change is most pronounced and most 
identifiable. Integration at this pOint, would accentuate the 
requirements for effective matching of the organization to its 
environment through internal restructuring. This is mutual adapta-
tion. In suppprt of this concept, Michael writes: 
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Of the utmost importances with more informational exposure (from 
the organization) to the environments the environment would be per-
ceived as itself differentiated and integrated into a variety of 
patterns according to the appreciative settings in the organization 
and among members and groups in the environment that influence the 
organization. 40 
In other words s integration is an ideal process within decision-
making whereby the adaptive and learning stages between organization 
and environment become one. It still remains theoretically important 
to delineate these two stages in order to describe a singular restruc-
turing of either the organization or the environment; independent of 
one another. What Schon describes as the loss of the stable state is 
this singular change. IMDM proposes to facilitate mutual aggregation 
through clarifying and displaying the decision-making process as a 
behaviors and a product of the organization-environmental system. In 
this manners the model proposes that organizational structures are 
decision-making strategies designed to achieve specific objectives. 
Argyris' comments are extremely supportive at this time: 
The structure of the organization is a snapshot or static picture 
of the dynamics of the strategy being used. From our point of views 
(a decision-making) strategy that optimizes the organizational core 
activities of achieving the objectives maintaining the organization, 
and adapting to the environment is the best strategy.41 
Therefores decision-making is essentially restructuring the 
organization to fit the environment and vise-versa. The processes of 
adaptation and learning are those stages which allow each entity to 
cope with change in an order1ys methodica1 s and controlled way. In 
this manner, Integrated Management Decision-Making can be viewed as an 
educational strategy in response to change. Taking on an organiza-
tional development feature, IMDM facilitates a "change in beliefs, 
attitudes, values, and structures of organizations so that they can 
better adapt to new technologies, markets, challenges, and the 
dizzying rate of change ifself .1142 
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Information Feedback. The final stage in the decision-making 
process is information feedback. It is through this crucial looping 
of information that a system evaluates where it is in terms of where 
it intends to go. It is the means by which evaluation takes place, 
where error is detected and "thereby it provides the basis from 
learning how to get from here to there through changes in performance 
that result in successive reductions in error. 1I43 Of central impor-
tance for decision-making, feedback also provides the information 
needed to assess the current state of organization-environmental 
balance. In this manner, feedback provides the mechanisms, for revis-
ing definitions of the present, along with the means for linking them 
with future actions. 
Effective information feedback focuses on matching the organiza-
tional actions and goals to the environmental conditions. In this 
con- text, feedback must constantly emphasize the detection of 
environmental signals that reflect organizational action. If such 
signals are not generated or perceived, then the process ceases to be 
a system. Therefore, feedback provides the network of monitoring 
environmental change. 
This task is extremely important for decision-making, however, it 
is complicated by several factors. First, there are the continual 
communication problems (previously discussed) which formulate 
ambiguities in goals and objectives. These make it difficult, if not 
impossible to specify what signals can act as relevant feedback. 
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There are also contradictions and ambiguities within the organization 
itself as to which objectives are important and which are not; again, 
making interpretation of feedback difficult. Second, the relationship 
between environment and organization is dynamic and turbulent. In 
this unstable state, a natural barrier exists which may prohibit 
responses between organization output and environmental impact. Emery 
and Trist wrote extensively on this subject matter--the blockage of 
feedback loops caused by environmental upheaval. 44 Then too, the 
environment in which organizations interact is extremely complex and 
large. This facilitates inadequate and confused technological and 
conceptual schemes for evaluation. Finally, there are time 
constraints and resource limitations, along with other organizational 
characteristics that permit no more than a "bounded" viewpoint or 
reference to "rationality.145 Obviously, that was what Simon 
contended in his theoretical argument. 
Integrated Management Decision-Making attempts to alleviate many 
of these information feedback barriers through restructuring. Since 
the focal point and main emphasis of IMDM is on integrated learning 
between organization and environment, a forced restructuring of infor-
mation monitoring components must occur. Many of the ambiguities and 
confusions existing in organizations are due to a failure to openly 
interact. Distrust, anxieties, and status produce a fear of feedback; 
since more information will be available to more sources about the 
environmental consequences of one's activities. IMDM stresses 
learning; and if that can occur only through trial and error or 
mistakes, then so be it. Restructuring of the organization to totally 
respond to the environment through integrated means is essential. 
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This is not a new concept, it is just an underdeveloped one. The 
emergence of futuristic thinking stresses strategic planning, economic 
forecasting and analysis, and creative modeling to grasp the 
multi-dimensional levels of organization-environmental feedback. 46 
Once again, Michael concurs with this concept: 
Ideally, feedback should help reduce uncertainty by clarifying the 
extent to which intended result is presently on track and the ways 
in which it is not; and by clarifying and discriminating between 
options by feeding back into the present, so to speak, carefully 
worked out conjectures about the future ••• (this necessitates) 
changing to structures that facilitate this process. 
Here then, is the basis of Integrated Management Decision-Making; 
to be innovative and imaginative in forethought based on an interactive 
learning and feedback experience between organization and environment. 
This process enables both entities to alter and adapt in original 
design through trial and error or evaluation. Such a process is 
flexible, and is characterized by fluidity and continuous evolvement 
between stages. 
Integrated Management Decision-Making and Police Patrol Allocation 
The allocation of patrol personnel is one of the most important 
decisions a police manager can make since between 70-95 percent of 
most police budgets are for salaries, it is apparent that the major 
cos~ for resources involves a department's manpower. 48 Therefore, 
the obvious starting point for increasing productivity and managerial 
decision-making must focus on the effective and efficient utilization 
of police manpower. Further, patrol deployment not only produces a 
significant economic factor for police agencies, but also creates a 
number of other social, political, and community ramifications. For 
instance, the way in which police are allocated has far reaching 
racial tones in many cities as well as political gestures for ruling 
elitists; or allocation design may drastically effect certain crime 
patterns (i.e. prostitution, pornography, drug abuse) which in turn, 
may bolster social reform and social change movements. Therefore, it 
is essential that police manpower allocation be conducted through a 
process which provides for futuristic thinking arid concurrent 
organization-environmental learning. 
Additionally, manpower allocation is characterized by a multi-
plicity of decisions. It is not determined by a single judgment or 
sole quantitative figure such as the increasing or decreasing of 
police personnel. Rather, patrol allocation is derived through the 
calculation of several independent decision-products. These are: 
(1) The computation of an assignment availability factor, 
(2) The determination of shift and manpower requirements, 
(3) The design of sectors or beats, and; 
(4) The selection of a patrol strategy. 
These decisions must be integrated with one another as the 
organization adapts to the environment with which it is changing. 
Another important consideration concerning the focus of this 
study, is found in the conditions surrounding deployment designs for 
small urban cities. As elaborated in Chapter I, there appears to be 
several factors (i.e. increased crime patterns, economic instability, 
social and political uniqueness, and non-comprehensive, traditional 
deployment plans) which exacerbate the failures of allocation 
decision-making in this critical police area. 
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For these reasons, there is a need to improve decision-making in 
the deployment of police personnel. Integrated Management Decision-
Making provides the means by which advancement to effective and effi-
cient manpower allocation can be achieved. This process incorporates 
three specific features which overcome several of the deficiencies 
previously described in other manpower deployment methods. These are: 
1. IMDM does not need the direct use of a computer and certainly 
not the continual use of a computer assisted dispatch model. 
This feature alone decreases cost and complexity. 
2. IMDM provides a way to continually update and modify patrol 
deployment plans without costly additions or technological 
applications. This is accomplished through quarterly 
evaluations of specific variables utilized in the deployment 
plan, and; 
3. IMDM address the local, decision-making elements of small 
urban centers by incorporating direct imput from police 
manager and other community officials. This feature provides 
a means for assessing and evaluating various environmental 
concerns such as political pressures, economic demands, 
racial issues, cultural forces, etc. which have an important 
impact on managerial police decision-making and manpower 
deployment. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapters, the general nature of decision-making 
as applied to police organization and management was discussed; and 
those prior efforts to examine mathematical designs in patrol alloca-
tion was reviewed, noting both their contributions and shortcomings. 
Additionally, in this chapter, a new technique entitled Integrated 
Management Decision-making was introduced to provide a new and innova-
tive model for decision-making. Here, specific parameters for the 
application of this model (to police patrol allocation) are delineated 
dealing with the research design, the nature of the data, the state-
ment of research objectives, statistical analysis and hypothesis, and 
the definition of specific terms. Each of the above necessarily 
places restrictions on the course of this study and, therefore, will 
be addressed in some detail. 
Research Design 
This study was undertaken to examine and review the theoretical 
issues concerning decision-making. From this search, a new model was 
formulated Integrated Management Decision-Making. This model was 
applied to the task of police patrol allocation in small urban 
centers. The City of Jonesboro, Arkansas, was used as a test case for 
the demonstration of this process. 
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Matilda White-Riley points out that the test-case study design is 
highly effective when conducting exploratory research for model 
building. l The procedure provides for an extremely detailed, 
descriptive, qualitative and quantitative approach to the under-
standing of a social system or decision-making process. 
Further, if we consider the inheritance of a test-case approach 
from the social sciences, we find a methodology that enables the 
researcher to explain more clearly what has happened in particular 
circumstances, and to illuminate the social, cultural, and managerial 
dynamics governing ways in which people respond to new events and new 
procedures. 
Although our horizons are strongly influenced by quantitative 
studies and statistical analysis, there remains a conventional test 
case approach to management decision-making and policy formation that 
is derived from these social science methodologies. Pressman and 
Wildavsky's insight on implementation in Oakland is a case in 
point. 2 As Geis and Stotland noted recently, test-case studies and 
demonstrative analysis can make a contribution to systematic scholarly 
research on decision-making, and they have been pleased to find that 
the tradition is enjoying a rebirth. 3 Further, this research design 
is not only descriptive in nature, but can be used to systematically 
measure the response of the environment, given an external stimulus. 
Specifically, this approach is most suited to test new ideas and 
innovations in organization-environmental behavior. 4 
Data Source 
To a large extent, there is a lack of adequate research with 
respect to decision-making and police manpower allocation. This may 
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be attributed to the inadequacy of available data sources. Police 
agencies, often fail to record and report statistics in a form amen-
able to social research. Criminal activity data and number of calls 
for services, for example, are often incomplete and not compiled in a 
manner which easily links possible predictive variables to manpower 
allocation. It is not surprising that earlier investigations of man-
power allocation have centered attention solely on mathematical 
designs not considering management objectives, goals or decision-
making processes, since such data is often subjective and difficult to 
assess. Rarely, specific projects are undertaken which attempt to 
weave the raw data and the subjective values together in an attempt to 
formulate an ideal method. 
The raw data base for the present study was derived from radio-
dispatch logs, detective entries, and official criminal incident 
reports maintained by the Jonesboro Police Department. Every radio 
call dispatched to a uniform or detective unit in the Jonesboro Police 
Department was explored for the time period of January 1, 1980 to 
December 31, 1980. During this one year period, data were compiled on 
over 8,300 police requests. A complete census of this time period was 
taken based on three issues: 
1. A census of a complete year compensates for seasonal 
variances. 
2. One year, is in actuality, a sample in itself. Acccording to 
Shanahan, the use of the preceding year gives the most 
accurate data base for manpower distribution needs. 5 
3. The Jonesboro Police Department Records Division and Radio 
Division are currently undergoing a radical change in main-
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tenance of criminal activity statistics, police reports, and 
radio dispatching procedures. The collection of accurate and 
complete data previous to 1980 would be impossible. 
Thus, the challenge facing the Jonesboro Police Department, and 
other agencies, is to obtain maximum efficiency and effectiveness in 
deploying police manpower resources based, in part, on collected 
historical data. There are inherent limitations to this data source. 
First, not all requests for police services, especially those involv-
ing IIco1d ll felony-type crimes (i.e. week-old burglaries, aggravated 
assaults involving known offenders, and miscellaneous sex offenses) 
are tabulated in police dispatch logs or officer reports. Instead, 
such cases are often handled strictly by Detective Division, by-
passing direct police service. This practice has been somewhat con-
fined by the implementation of a 1191111 emergency number, yet an 
estimated ten percent of criminal activity is reported to police via 
this method. 6 
Additionally, statistical data derived from police reports are 
often misconstrued as IIcrime rates. 1I Crimes known to the police bear 
an unknown relationship to actual total criminal activity. Obviously, 
many crimes are never reported to the police. 7 Wilson and Boland 
argue that since police have little or no control over the willingness 
of citizens to report crime, then the only measures viable for study 
are those which at least display calculable sums for a reference in 
patterns and trends.8 For this reason, calls for services are sug-
gested as measurable indicators for workload among police. 
Aside from the raw data, subjective values and priorities are 
placed on each variable tabulated from the 8,300 requests for police 
services (by the police manager). In this manner, police allocation 
is developed to accommodate the individuality of the community for 
which it is designed. 
Predictability and the Nature of the Data 
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While there are several approaches to the manpower distribution 
problem, all have the common denominator of attempting to predict or 
forecast needs for police services. Traditionally, and in this study, 
a sample of past events has been recorded under the assumption that 
history wiil repeat itself. It has been assumed that previous calls 
for service will continue to occur in the same frequency and in the 
same geographical location. It is important to note that there is an 
irreducible limit to the precision which can be obtained from any pre-
dictive mechanism. To some extent, those things which are to be pre-
dicted are intrinsically uncertain. No matter what kind or how much 
data are collected, or how these data are processed, completely 
accurate forecasts are unobtainable. 9 The practical problem is to 
obtain as much accuracy as possible. 
The problem of accuracy has several aspects. In general, there 
is no scientific theory which purports to explain the genises of calls 
for police services. To some extent the process which generates these 
events is under control of the police department. By adopting an 
internal policy, the rate of calls can either be increased or 
decreased within limits. At the same time much of the generation of 
calls for services can be explained only by factors which are com-
pletely outside the control of the police department. Moreover, these 
exogeneous factors are dynamic; they are in a continual process of 
change and must somehow be allowed for in the predictive mechanism. 
Thus, a predictive procedure which attempts to explain or predict the 
• 
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generation of calls for service in terms of a structural model involv-
ing a fundamental set of exogeneous, independent variables, must at 
the same time predict the police department's own internal policies. 
In the present state of knowledge it is unlikely that a sufficiently 
flexible predictive model can be constructed on this basis. 
The principal alternative to a structural model is some type of 
reduced form which predicts future events in terms of the past history 
of events, as produced in this dissertation. 
Definition of Terms 
The most frequently used terms are defined in the context in 
which they are used in this study. 
Police Unit. A police patrol call occupied by either one or two 
officers assigned to a specific geographical area. 
Police Call. A request for police service that was transmitted 
from the radio dispatcher to the police unit. 
Back-up or Cover Unit. A second police unit dispatched to a 
location. 
Sector. A specific geographic area assigned to a patrol unit; a 
beat. 
Shift. An arrangement of working hours which allows x-number of 
police units be available on a twenty-four hour basis; duty period. 
Response Time. The period of time calculated from dispatch time 
to arrival time. 
Call Time. The period of time calculated from arrival time to 
clear time. 
Elapsed Time. The period of time calculated from dispatch time 
to clear time. 
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Police Patrol Techniques. A variety of police patrol programs 
aimed at controlling the level of occurrence of specific crimes in 
designated geographical areas. Examples of these techniques are Crime 
Specific Analysis, Directed Patrol, Two-man Patrol, and Team 
Policing. 10 
Operationalization of Variables 
The following variables are selected to be included in the 
present study. 
Time. The variable of time was measured in six different modes. 
Each police call was tabulated by: (1) month of the year, (2) day of 
the month, (3) day of the week, (4) dispatch time of the police call 
to the police unit, (5) arrival time of the police unit to the dis-
patched location, and (6) clear time or time which the police unit 
left a dispatched police call and was available for additional duties. 
Weight Factor of Call. This is a subjective assignment, of 
ordinal nature, based on the urgency of the police call. The weight 
coincides with the response procedure conducted by the dispatched 
police unit. Weight factor 3 is a "code 3" call representing a 
criminal act in progress or an emergency displaying imminent peril to 
human life (i.e. a robbery in progress, an officer needs immediate 
help, or a shooting); weight factor 2 is a "code 2" call representing 
a need for assistance rapidly, however~ no imminent peril to human 
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life exists (i.e. a family fight, a neighborhood disturbance, a 
burglary alarm); weight factor 1 is a "code 111 call representing a 
need for assistance without urgency (i.e. a "cold" burglary, an escort 
request, a barking dog). Traffic accidents were weighted based on the 
in-depth analysis of police reports which reflected an emergency con-
dition, the nature of injuries sustained, if any, and/or the existence 
of an imminent threat to human life. ll 
Allocation of a Second Police Unit. A simple two digit code 
classified the presence or absence of a dispatched back-up or cover 
unit. 
Seriousness of Arrest. The variable of seriousness of arrest was 
separated into four ordinal classifications: (1) no arrest made stem-
ming from the police call, (2) a traffic citation or police summons 
was issued, (3) a misdemeanor arrest was made stemming from the police 
call, or (4) a felony arrest was produced from the police call. All 
charges or arrests were classified by the Arkansas State Criminal Code 
as to felony or misdemeanor in nature. 
Type of Incident. Each dispatched police call was nominally 
classified into the following types of incidents: 
1. Murder - Homicide 
2. Aggravated Assault 
3. Forcible Rape 
4. Robbery 
5. Burglary 
6. Theft over $100.00 
7. Auto - Motor Vehicle Theft 
B. All other criminal offenses of a felony nature 
9. All other ciminal offenses of a misdemeanor nature 
10. Traffic accident 
11. Calls for service (miscellaneous) 
12. Neighborhood problem/disturbance 
13. Family fight/problem 
14. Assist outside agency 
15. Alarms 
Subjective Prioritization. This critical element to the 
decision-making method was a simple ordinal ranking of raw data 
variables into most desirable to least desirable for allocation 
design. This prioritization of variables was a direct input from the 
police manager. 
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Geographical Location of an Incident. A map of the surrounding 
Jonesboro, Arkansas, area (approximately 150 square miles) was divided 
into 260 square geographical blocks, each block representing a .5 
square mile location within the metropolitan center. Each block was 
alphabetically and numerically coded. Whenever a police call was 
tabulated, the specific geographical block code was used to designate 
location. There were 57 such blocks within the city boundaries. 
Multiple Reponse Index (MRI). A calculated value for each of the 
above described geographical locations based on the subjective priori-
tization of variables by the police manager. Multiple response 
indices are determined through the SPSS program, Multiple Response 
Analysis. For this study, the multiple response index for a given 
geographical location is calculated by prioritizing the variables of 
(l) incident type, (2) weight factor, (3) seriousness of arrest, and 
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(4) allocation of second police unit. The summation of this prioriti-
zation for each police call tabulated within a specific geographical 
location equals the multiple response index. 
Equalization of Workload. A calculation which represents the 
same proportional amount of work per officer independent of day, duty 
period, or geographical region. This variable is measured by calcu-
lating a value (the multiple response index) for a specific geographi-
cal region. The measurement of this variable assumes that each 
officer is equally capable of serving a call. 12 
Calls for Service. The number of police calls tabulated within a 
specific period of time. 
Statistical Analysis 
Measures of association and tests of significance are utilized to 
examine the relationship between variables in order to design an ideal 
decision-making method for police patrol allocation. Much of the 
earlier research on the topic of optimum patrol design (discussed in 
the previous chapter) has employed either one or the other of these 
techniques, but few have simultaneously used both. Measures of asso-
ciation are used to designate the strength of relationship between 
variables, while tests of significance give indication of the 
probability of whether relations observed are due to chance varia-
tion. 13 
In this study, there are two analytic procedures to be utilized, 
Multiple Response Analysis and the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance 
by Ranks. 
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Multiple Response Analysis (MRA). This particular statistic has 
been incorporated into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS), an integrated system of computer programs designed for the 
analysis of social science data. 14 The system was developed at the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago in 
1970. Multiple Response Analysis is a non-parametric technique dis-
playing the strength of a relationship between variables. 
It is a statistical procedure which preserves the order of the 
responses or variables (input) and permits analysis of the "most 
important" variable as though it were a normal variable. This tech-
nique holds constant the prioritized ordering of input data. The 
design specifically permits analysis of simple variables, multiple 
dichotomies, and multiple response items both individually and in con-
junction with one another. The procedure provides two types of 
output--frequency tables and n-way crosstabulations.1 5 
The statistics provided by MRA which are used in this study are 
the following: 
1. Chi-Square: Chi-square is a test of statistical significance 
which determines whether a systematic relationship exists 
between variables. This is done by computing the cell fre-
quencies (of a table) which would be expected if no relation-
ship is present between the variable given the existing row 
and column totals. The expected cell frequencies are then 
compared to the actual values found within the table. 16 
2. Contingency Coefficient: The contingency coefficient C is a 
measure of association based upon chi-square. It is used to 
compare tables having 'the same dimensions. 17 
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3. Multiple Reponse Index {MRI}: This is the most important 
computation from the Multiple Response Analysis technique. A . 
separate value is calculated for each data entry based upon 
an additive and weighting process. 18 The MRI ;s a value to 
be utilized in other statistical techniques {for this study, 
the Kruskal-Wallis Test is employed}, to examine the 
relationship between subjective variable input (from the 
police manager) and equalization of workload. 
Multiple Response Analysis is selected for the present study 
since it meets all the basic analysis needs for this dissertation. It 
utilizes measures of association between variables in nominal scale. 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test. The Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance 
by Ranks is an extremely useful test for deciding whether 
k~i~dependent samples are from different populations or have extreme 
d~fferences in mean parameters. Sample values almost invariably 
differ somewhat, and the question is whether the differences among the 
samples signify genuine population differences or whether they 
represent random chance variables such as are to be expected. The 
Kruskal-Wallis technique tests the null hypothesis that the k-samples 
come from the same population or from identical populations with 
respect to averages. The Kruskal-Willis Test can be used for com-
parative purposes.1 9 
The test assumes that the variable under study has an underlying 
continuous distribution. It requires ordinal measurements of that 
variable. 20 
Compared with the most powerful parametric statistic, the F-test, 
the Kruskal-Wallis Test has a power efficiency of 95.5 percent. 2l 
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The test involves a comparison of the sums of the rankings for 
each of the categories of the nominal-scale variable. In this study, 
original manpower design is nominally divided into sectors, the sum-
mation of rankings of Multiple Response Indices is then compared to 
the proposed manpower design. A statistic H is computed in order to 
measure the degree to which the various sums of ranks differ from what 
would be expected under the null hypothesis. The sampling distribu-
tion of H is approximately chi-square. 22 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test is selected for the present study since 
it meets all the basic analysis needs for this dissertation. It was 
chosen rather than the equivalent parametric test in order to avoid 
making the assumptions concerning normality and homogeniety of 
variance associated with the parametric F-test, and to increase the 
generality of findings. 23 
Statement of Hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
It is assumed that the medians of the multiple response index 
populations are equal. 
Limitations 
Several important limitations of this study must be mentioned. 
Since each of these may have implications for the results, they should 
be given attention as limiting factors. 
First, the data for this study are limited by time and space. 
The population is limited to calls for service for the Jonesboro, 
Arkansas Police Department. Only police calls which were actually 
dispatched to police units were given consideration. Further, the 
data are derived from incidents occurring only in the year 1980. 
Missing or incomplete sampling is an unavoidable limitation of 
this study. Data were compiled from police records which do not have 
exacting controls or accuracy checks. It is probable that certain 
insignificant calls (such as barking dogs, misparked cars, etc.) were 
not represented on the radio-dispatched log for each occasion. Then 
too, the sample size of over 8,300 pieces presented human observation 
and tabulation procedures which may have resulted in error. These 
measurement errors weaken statistical relationships which means that 
they may truly exist even though they are shown to be statistically 
insignificant. 24 
In the techniques of analysis selected, the chief limitation is 
that the Kruskal-Wallis Test is insensitive to population normality 
and homogeneity of variance. The data presented in this study is 
nominal and ordinal and, therefore, discrete. However, the Kruskal-
Wallis Test is the most appropriate and efficient test given the data 
assumptions. It converts scores to ranks, thereby preserving 
magnitude of the scores and utilizing more of the information in data 
observations than any other non-parametric statistic. 25 
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Finally, this study is restricted to a unique case--Jonesboro, 
Arkansas. Also, the study is restricted to the variables in the data 
base. Even though the major objective of this dissertation is to 
design a method for decision-making in which different variables from 
other city departments may be utilized, it must be emphasized that the 
results of this study would probably be different if the information 
was taken from other points in time and location. 
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CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION OF INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
TO POLICE PATROL DEPLOYMENT METHOD 
In this chapter, a transition is presented from the theoretical 
model to the practical method of police patrol deployment. Similar 
components are discussed in relation to this transition. Further, a 
description of the Jonesboro, Arkansas Police Department, as well as 
the city itself, is provided for reference information. 
The final part of this chapter focuses on the decision-products 
derived from the application of this model to patrol deployment in 
Jonesboro. As mentioned earlier, these decision-products include the 
determination of :(1) assignment-availability factor; (2) shift 
requirement; (3) sector design; and (4) patrol strategy. 
Transition From Model to Method 
In Chapter III, the theoretical framework for Integrated Manage-
ment Decision-making was presented. Here, refinement of the model 
produces a method which can be employed in the allocation of police 
patrol in small urban centers. Each "stage" of the theoretical model 
can be correspondingly deduced to a step within the deployment 
method. Therefore, this transition assimilates conceptual components 
to working parts in order to accomplish a desired result. 
Criteria. The initial step in any problem-solving model (whether 
it be conceptual or practical) is to define and set objectives. The 
102 
criteria step in the deployment plan is congruent with the lIarticula-
tion of objectivell stage in the theoretical abstraction, with 
additional elaboration. 
The objective for manpower deployment is allocation based on 
equalized workload. However, there are interpretive problems as to 
what exactly is lIequalized work10ad. 1I As described in Chapter I, 
equalized workload studies have produced a variety of programs based 
on observations and activity reports that classify lIequalized work-
load ll in terms of hazard-formula, police time, total activity, preven-
tative patrol, type of call, etc. l It should be clearly noted, that 
the purpose of equalizing workload is not necessarily to reduce crime, 
but to increase the productive use of existing resources. Thus, the 
unique feature built-in to the criteria step of this method involves 
the selection and prioritization of variables on which the objective 
is structured. The police manager or police chief selects a set of 
variables which act as IIstepsll to the accomplishment of the 
objective. In every city there are a number of external or internal 
variables which effect patrol deployment. Some of these may be the 
type of police call, the elapsed time of each call, the number of 
serious shootings per district, the number of drunk driver caused 
accidents in a given time period, the type of arrests made in a 
specific location, response time, number of assaulted officers in each 
district, number of reported crimes per location, etc. The list can 
go on forever; and is limited only by the user's imagination and the 
ability to collect relevant data pertaining to each variable. For 
example, a police chief could not select the variable of number of 
elderly white rape victims per district if he had no historical record 
nor manner in which to collect the age or race of victims. The 
variable has to be tabulated, or at least, able to be documented for 
use in the allocation-deployment method. 
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Further, the criteria stage is designed to accommodate up to five 
selected variables. Each variable is prioritized as to most important 
to least important in the design of patrol sectors and the feasibility 
of patrol strategies. Each variable receives this prioritization by 
use of the multiple response index. A simple weighting scale is 
designed so that the number one prioritized variable receives the 
highest value and the least important variable receives the lowest 
value. 
As demonstrated for use in this study, the police chief in 
Jonesboro, Arkansas selected the following variables, listed in order 
of importance (highest-first): 
Type of call per district = weight of 4 
Priority of call per district = weight of 3 
Type of arrest made at each call = weight of 2 
Need for assistance or cover at each call = weight of 1 
The chief wished to select only four variables, however, he could 
have chosen one more, or conversely deleted two. In any case, the 
variables chosen were documented on dispatch logs and activity sheets 
rendering an historical pattern for the past year. The selection and 
prioritization of variables is an extremely important element in the 
method as all further analysis and processes assume the "criteria" as 
a fundamental guideline on which to base the achievement of the stated 
objective. 
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This step provides two innovative procedures in the design of a 
deployment plan. First, the "criteria" or variables on which the . 
objective is structured can be altered to fit the management desires 
of any department. By simply "plugging-inn those variables by which 
the user wishes deployment to be predicted, the method takes on a 
flexible and adaptive quality unique to each community environment or 
departmental characteristic. For the first time in allocation design, 
the input for deployment is strategically placed with the police 
manager. All too often, the consultant or researcher entertains the 
illusion that he is the expert in the community under study, as 
Maruyama so accurately stresses. 2 This design method emphasizes the 
utility of management input. Further, the selection of criteria is 
not limited to that of the police chief. It is highly advisable that 
user input be broadened to include attitudes of non-police, city 
administrators. Since funding and expenditure are often times 
political entities, it should be natural for input to include those 
ideas from controlling bodies such as mayors, councilmen, aldermen, 
and other community leaders. Involving the power structure of any 
community into critical decision-making (such as "how" police manpower 
I 
is distributed) maintains an optimum communication-feedback between 
the city government and the police organization as well as identifies 
any political or opposing phenomena. 
Secondly, this patrol plan incorporates the use of several 
different variables in the allocation of manpower. It is not based on 
a singular or structured variable. It has the unique capability of 
changing with different departments, environments, and times as the 
future evolves. This enables any department to maintain a dynamic 
feature in patrol deployment amid a turbulent and rapidly changing 
environment, so characteristically documented in today's world. 3 
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Allocation. This step is similar to the "implementation" stage. 
It requires doing something with data and information. In this step 
the design of allocation is applied to the environment or; the 
decision-products regarding equalization by prioritized criteria are 
computed. The allocation of manpower is based on the equalization of 
workload represented in multiple response indices predicated by the 
selected criteria. Certain values such as assignment-availability 
factors, workload by month and day, workload by hour, response time, 
and frequency of police calls by month, day and hour are determined to 
establish shift requirements and sector design. Allocation can be 
viewed as a response of the police organization to environmental 
pressures existing in the "criteria" stage. 
In this study, the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance Test is 
utilized to compare workload in the original sector design (currently 
used in Jonesboro) to the proposed sector design (which results from a 
physical manipulation of district/beat boundaries attempting to 
equalize workload). The calculated H value, approximately chi-square 
and having a power efficiency of 95.5 percent of that of the F test, 
indicates differences between sector workload within the two designs. 
The Kruskal-Wallis procedure will be further discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Strategies. In this section, an assessment of patrol strategies 
and techniques is discussed in order to select a particular form of 
patrol. Herman Goldstein has raised an interesting pOint in his book, 
Policing a Free Society.4 Once sectors have been designed and a 
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number of men have been deployed to areas of police protection, the 
level of patrol is of less importance than the form of patrol 
activities. Stated much more simply, the Kansas City experiment 
showed no significant differences in the incidence of crime resulting 
from variations in the number of officers assigned, or level of 
patrol. However, the form of patrol has proven to make a significant 
difference when considering the evaluations of Team Policing, Directed 
Patrol, Split-Force Patrol, Tactical Patrol, etc. 5 
The "strategies" component allows the police manager to assess 
different patrol forms singularly or in combination with the 
"allocation" of sector designs presented in the earlier step. The 
ideal situation, facilitated by the method, is to match sector and 
shift design with a patrol strategy that renders an optimum manpower 
distribution through total participation of the police organization. 
Obviously, the strategies component in this practical method can be 
equated to the "organization-environmental learning" stage in the 
conceptual model. Both parts involve an attempt to integrate the 
organization with the environment. In practical application, this 
interprets into learning how to assimilate allocation design and 
patrol strategy. The environment is altered during the "implementa-
tion" stage or allocation component, hence the organization learns to 
improve deployment further by complementing this change with an 
amenable patrol strategy. Such a process is seen as an organizational 
action intended to meld objectives with surrounding influences. 
Decision. This step is similar to the "adaptation" stage. It 
represents the final response of the organization to effectively cope 
with change started earlier in the implementation process. Here, 
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final manpower adjustments are integrated with the strategies com-
ponent to result in a design of optimum effectiveness through 
equalized workload and total participation. For the police organiza-
tion, this step may call for an increase or decrease in overall 
personnel, resources, and equipment, depending on the degree of change 
necessary to adapt to new contingencies and situtations. Ideally, as 
in the conceptual model, this step is totally integrated with the 
learning process so that maximum foresight and flexibility can be 
attained in matching environmental pressures. 
Evaluation. Following the principle that a model for decision-
making applied to the deployment of police personnel must not be done 
once and then forgotten, the evaluation step acts as a monitoring 
device to remind organizations of current change. This necessitates 
the periodic examination of environmental features and criminal-
incident patterns. 
The patrol force distribution should be evaluated quarterly or 
once every three months. Similar to the "feedbackll stage, evaluation 
permits the continual updating of informatioh on which deployment is 
based. For the most part, changes will be subtle for small to 
medium-size police departments; however, through a careful analysis, 
the police administrator will be able to observe them and then 
anticipate the police service that will be required in the future, for 
truly, "what is past is prologue. 1I6 
Additionally, evaluation consists of analyzing what the current 
organizational objectives are in relation to environmental influences 
and demands. Evaluation, therefore, consists of deciphering those 
signals that suggest changes in the organization. For example, police 
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departments have traditionally failed to incorporate political and 
economic conditions in planning for manpower deployment. However, as 
exhibited in many cities today, there exists a relationship between 
crime patterns and employment rates or between service demands and 
poverty levels. 7 Evaluation and information feedback assists the 
police organization in refining these relationships as well as 
identifying those areas of potential concern. 
Figure 2 displays a schematic of the patrol deployment method as 
derived from the theoretical model--Integrated Management Decision-
making. The following discussion sets forth those decision-products 
obtained by the application of this model to the Jonesboro, Arkansas 
Police Department. 
The Test Case: Jonesboro, Arkansas 
The City. The City of Jonesboro, in northeastern Arkansas, with 
a population of 32,000, is the center of an urban community of over 
65,000 people. An agriculturally-based trade city, it is the 
headquarters of Riceland Incorporated, and boasts the largest rice 
mill in the world as well as other substantial grain processing 
facilities. It supports several large industrial complexes such as 
DuPont manufacturing, General Electric engineering, and Krueger 
publishing. While Jonesboro has attempted to maintain a diverse 
economic base, agriculture and farming still remains the singular, 
most important labor market. Subsequently, with the rise in interest 
rates and a poor national economy, coupled with a severe 1979-1980 
drought, Jonesboro (along with the rest of Arkansas) is undergoing a 
period of economic decline. 
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In many ways, the city is atypical of the South. Over 90 percent 
of the city's population is white and only 7 percent of the population 
is b1ack.8 The vast majority of the population is native-born to' 
the Ozark regions of lower Missouri and Arkansas, and settled in 
Jonesboro where centralized trade and farming offered employment 
opportunities. In 1979, the Bureau of Census ranked Arkansas 49th out 
of the 50 states having the lowest average earned income, head of 
household at $6,785.00. 9 
The government of Jonesboro is similar to other cities having a 
city council and mayor, with exception to the prolific number of 
councilmen. There are 12 aldermen who sit as heads of various com-
mittees and departments within the administration and a mayor with 
over 15 years experience as chief executive. 
The crime rate in Jonesboro is well below the national average 
and the average for all cities of population 25,000 to 49,999. Refer 
to Table 1. 
Total 
Violent 
Property 
TABLE I 
RATE OF INDEX OFFENSES KNOWN TO POLICE, 1979 
PER 100,000 POPULATION 
National Average 
Non-Metro Cities 
4364 
285 
4079 
Arkansas 
3621 
366 
3255 
Jonesboro* 
1748 
66 
1682 
*Based on Jonesboro, Arkansas residential populations of 25,000. 
Calculated from Jonesboro Police Department Records and FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports, 1979. 
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Residents of the city proclaim that such a low crime phenomena is 
the result of religious rebirth. Situated in the "Heart of the Bible 
Belt," Jonesboro supports over 100 separate churches, the main denomi-
nation being of Southern Baptist extraction. The religious tempo of 
the city is credited for denying the dispensing or selling of 
alcoholic beverages in the county. Jonesboro is a "dry" city. 
However, other reasons drastically effect the low reported crime 
rate in Jonesboro which are not highly publicized. First, there are 
two means by which crime activity is documented. One of these methods 
is the simple tabulation of "incidents reported to po1ice. 1I The other 
is a classification of "crimes under investigation." It appears that 
the Jonesboro Police Department reports (to the FBI) only those crimes 
falling within the second category. Criminal incidents which do not 
have obvious follow-up leads or investigative directions and which are 
of a minor consequence, (such as bicycle thefts, simple vandal isms, 
and minor fights) are simply forgotten and rarely addressed. 
Secondly, while conducting research at the Jonesboro Police Depart-
ment, the author became aware of several criminal incidents which were 
brought to the attention of the police, however, never formally 
reported. The major reason for this second failure is tied to the 
problems produced by the first. Jonesboro police officers are very 
cognizant of the department's procedure regarding follow-up investiga-
tions. Knowing that little, if any, investigation would ever result 
from the incident report; officers simply do not take the report for 
reasons of expediency. As one officer stated, "Why take the report • 
• • nothing is going to come of it anyway." 
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The Police Department. The Jonesboro Police Department is an 
urban law enforcement agency consisting of 44 sworn personnel, having 
jurisdiction over a 40 square mile area. 10 It is headquartered i~ 
the Justice Complex which serves as, housing for the district and 
~ 
circuit court as well as the police department. Security is very 
relaxed, with an attitude of "being friendly" more important than 
taking necessary safeguards. For this reason, the radio-dispatcher 
often acts as receptionist simultaneously, and police cars as well as 
front doors are rarely locked. 
The department is headed by a retired FBI agent native to the 
area. Refer to Figure 3 for an organizational chart of the depart-
ment. There is no civil service or police union and hiring and 
promotion is a discretionary move by the Chief. Jonesboro patrol 
officers are severely underpaid at $11,860.00 per year as compared to 
other similar department officers. ll Further, the Chief has con-
sistently requested additional manpower and equipment increases with 
little avail. All in all, these factors have led to poor morale among 
officers and a cynical attitude regarding change. 
However, after just one year of apPointment, the Chief has made 
continual progress in improving supervisor-officer relations, manage-
ment techniques, records and data collection, investigative 
procedures, and patrol deployment. 
Decision-Products 
This presentation shows the relationship between the current 
manpower deployment design utilized in Jonesboro and the proposed 
design based upon the calculations of equalized workload and multiple 
Captain 
I 
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Division 
I 
3 sworn officers 
I 
2 civilians 
Chief 
~ Secretary 
Assistant Chief ----
(sworn officer) 
I 
Captain 
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I 
28 sworn officers 4 civilians 
Total: 44 sworn personnel 
3 civilians 
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response indices. Disparaties between the two designs are emphasized 
by statistical procedure, specifically the Kruskal-Wa11is Test in 
sector pattern and percentile variance in shift scheme. 
Assignment-Availability Factor. 12 For every day of the year, 
twenty-four hours a day, there exists a manpower need for police 
agencies. The potential need in a patrol force is eight hours a day, 
three times a day. Each patrol officer is required to work eight 
hours a day. Each patrol officer is required to work eight hours a 
day for five consecutive days in the Jonesboro Police Department • 
. This is a common assignment period per officer found throughout police 
agencies. Further, each officer is assigned a beat, and the beat is 
manned for each tour of duty. However, in reality, no officer will 
man his sector each day of the year because of several factors. 
Before any deployment plan can be designed, a need arises to know 
the actual assignment-availability factor to man one sector once every 
eight hours for 365 days. To determine the number of officers 
necessary to man each beat at all times, it is necessary to find out 
in hours what is potentially available and what is actually available 
due to loss of officer time because of extenuating circumstances. 
These circumstances or factors are generally universal to all 
police agencies, including the Jonesboro Police Department. They are 
regular days off, vacations, sick time, training, holidays, military 
leave, court time, special details, officer suspension, and any other 
loss of time that may have a significant effect on availability of 
personnel. To calculate the potential need for available hours for 
one officer, the following formula is applied: 
Number of days/year X Number of hours in a shift 
365 X 8 = 2,920 potential hours available 
per officer per year 
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From the computation of 2,920 potential available hours per 
officer per year, it is possible to calculate an assignment-
availability factor needed to man one sector for eight hours each day, 
365 days a year. Using the Jonesboro Police Department individual 
circumstances and averages, a factor of 1.85 is computed. In simple 
terms this factor means that it requires the Jonesboro police agency 
to have 1.85 officers available to man one sector for eight hours for 
365 days or 5.55 officers to man one sector for twenty-four hours a 
day for 365 days. Refer to Table II for an outlay of relevant data 
and computed assignment-availability factors. 
Thus, the typical Jonesboro police officer works five days a 
week, and eight hours a day, assigned to one sector. There are 
currently four sectors in Jonesboro to be manned per shift. This 
computes into a need of 22.2 men available each day for patrol. 
Referring to Table III, it is observed that this need is statistically 
met. 
However, the original number of total men available for patrol is 
erroneous. Lieutenants are rarely assigned patrol sectors on a shift; 
their duty period is filled with supervisory, administrative and 
managerial tasks. Further, a Selective Traffic Enforcement Program 
utilizes two officers per shift or a total of six men. Table IV 
reveals that a maximum of 19 officers are available currently to man 
four sectors per shift twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. This 
is three men short of the calculated available-assignment factor for 
the Jonesboro Police Department. Refer to Table IV. 
TABLE II 
DATA AND COMPUTATION FOR ASSIGNMENT - AVAILABILITY FACTOR 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT* 
POTENTIAL HOURS AVAILABLE 2,920 
Circumstances under Consideration: 
Vacation Time (15 days X 8 hours) 120 
Regular Days Off (102 days X 8) 816 
Sick Time (20 days X 8) 160 
Training or Inservice (4 days X 8) 32 
Ho1 idays (12 days X 8) 96 
Court Time (8 days X 8) 64 
Mi 1 itary Leave (7 days X 8) 56 
Suspensions, Discipline ? 
Line of Duty Injury ? 
TOTAL: 1,344 
Remainder = 2,920 - 1,344 = 1,576 
. . 1 b· 1 . F 2,920 1 85 Asslgnment - Aval a 1 lty actor = =. 
1,576 
*Based on 1980 averages and figures. 
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TABLE III 
ASSIGNMENT - AVAILABILITY FACTORS 
28 OFFICER PATROL FORCE 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
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POTENTIAL MAN - DAYS AVAILABLE (365 days X 28) 10,220 
Vacation (15 days X 28) 420 
Regular Days Off (102 days X 28) 
Sick Time (20 days X 28) 
Training (4 days X 28) 
Holidays (12 days X 28) 
Court Time (8 days X 28) 
Military Leave (7 days X 28) 
Suspensions, Discipline 
Line of Duty Injury 
TOTAL: 
Remainder - 10,220 - 4,704 = 5,516 
2,856 
560 
112 
336 
224 
196 
? 
? 
4,704 
A . A ·1 b·1· F 10,220 - 1 85 ff· ss~gnment - va~ a ~ ~ty actor = 5,516 - . 0 ~cers 
Assignment - Availability Factor for 3 shifts = 5.5 officers 
Assignment - Availability Factor for 4 shifts =22.2 officers 
Current Patrol Manpower =28.0 officers 
TABLE IV 
CORRECTED ASSIGNMENT - AVAILABILITY FACTORS 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPART}ffiNT 
Current Patrol ~~npower 
Lieutenants 
Selective Traffic Enforcement 
Actual or Real Patrol Force 
3 
6 
28 officers 
19 officers 
Corrected Assignment - Availability Factor 22.2 officers 
Need (Manpower Increase) 3 officers 
Calculated Assignment - Availability Factor 
with proposed five man increase 
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(includes Lieutenants and Selective Traffic Enforcement) 
32.4 officers 
Jonesboro Patrol Manpower 
(with proposed five man increase) 33 officers 
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Thus, to maintain the current sector design, a manpower increase 
of three men is mandatory. For purposes of this dissertation, it is 
assumed that all manpower requests will be granted. Deliberation is 
currently on-going in the Jonesboro City government for a manpower 
increase of five officers (it is expected to be fulfilled). There-
fore, the corrected total number of available men for patrol is 33 
officers; which realistically and statistically meets a corrected 
available-assignment factor of 32.4 officers within the Jonesboro 
Police Department. Refer to Table IV. 
Shift Determination and Manpower Distribution. The Jonesboro 
police officer works a traditional five days a week, and eight hours 
each day. This is forty working hours per week per man. There are 33 
officers of all ranks in the department (3 lieutenants, 6 sergeants, 
and 24 officers) available for patrol services. 13 Allowing one 
lieutenant per shift, this would mean 30 officers times 40 hours, or 
1,200 man-hours of patrol force service per week. 
This section addresses the distribution of these 1,200 man-hours 
of patrol service over the 168 hours of the seven-day week. The goal 
is to provide an optimum arrangement of working hours by shift that 
would cause equalization of workload within shifts. Several variables 
will be studied regarding shift variance. These are the number of 
calls by month, the number of type of calls by day, the multiple 
response indices by day, shift differences in response time, number of 
calls by time and multiple response indices by time. An average 
hourly workload will be calculated based on multiple response indices 
and a within-shift variance will be computed for each set of shift 
time. 
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1. Number of Calls by Month. This frequency count is important 
as it shows variation between seasons. Obviously, some variation is 
expected. However, if extreme differences occur between months then 
an indication of altered manpower needs is required. Table V displays 
the number of calls by month. 
On observing Table V, it can be concluded that little variance is 
present between months. The standard deviation is low as well as the 
variance. 
It is noteworthy to observe that the summer months of June, July, 
August, and September reflected the most demand of police services. 
This is indicative of national trends displayed in the FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports for the last several years. 14 
2. Number of Calls by Day. This frequency count displays number 
of calls by day of week. It graphically displays which days require 
the most police service. Refer to Table VI. 
Friday and Saturday, again coinciding with national patterns, 
display the highest need for police manpower. 15 For the purposes of 
manpower distribution, it is important to split week-ends off. In 
other words, no one man receives both Friday and Saturday as regular 
days off. This will ease personnel desires as part of the week-end is 
"free" and allow a more equitable method of achieving maximum police 
service on those respective days. Changing days off is always a 
touchy subject among police officers. Everyone would like to have 
Friday and Saturday evening off, however, peak service is required on 
those days. To accommodate both equity among officer's days off and 
police service need, seniority should govern this issue. 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Totals: 
TABLE V 
NUMBER OF ~~LS BY MONTH, 1980 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Frequency Relative Percentage 
687 8.2 
583 7.0 
669 8.0 
629 7.5 
705 8.6 
766 9.2 
800 9.6 
810 9.7 
708 8.5 
705 8.4 
614 7.4 
650 7.9 
8,326 100.0 
Standard Deviation: 68.23 
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Monday 
Tuesday 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
Friday 
Saturday 
Sunday 
Tota 1: 
Standard Deviation: 
TABLE VI 
NUMBER OF CALLS BY DAY - 1980 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Freguencl Relative Percentage 
1,192 14.3 
1,193 1403 
1,047 12.6 
1,133 13.6 
1,371 16.2 
1,308 15.7 
1,082 13.0 
8,326 100.0 
116.95 
To check the tabulations of calls by day, a second frequency was 
computed. The difference being a plot of multiple response indices 
(instead of calls for service) against day of week. Figure 4 is a 
graphical display reinforcing the need for maximum police service on 
Friday and Saturday. 
3. Shift Assignment. The next step is to determine the optimum 
arrangement of working hours by shift based again, on multiple 
response indices set by the police manager. The shift hours selected 
should be those that have least variation in workload between hourly 
peaks and valleys regarding activity. This method will allow for the 
assignment of officers by shift, thus reducing the possibility of 
having too many or too few officers on duty at any given time. 16 
Table VII reflects the frequency of number of calls by hour by 
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current shift. An extremely low chi-square and high variance supports 
Multiple Response 
Index 
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• 
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(83.6) 
88.1 
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(88.1) 
Figure 4: Graphical display - multiple response indices by day of week. 
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TABLE VII 
NUMBER OF CALLS BY HOUR BY CURRENT SHIFT, 1980 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Morning Shift: 
7:00 a.m. - 7:59 a.m. 
8:00 a.m. - 8:59 a.m. 
9:00 a.m. - 9:59 a.m. 
10:00 a.m. - 10:59 a.m. 
11:00 a.m. 11:59 a.m. 
12:00 noon - 12:59 p.m. 
1:00 p.m. - 1:59 p.m. 
2:00 p.m. - 2:59 p.m. 
Subtotals: 
Afternoon Shift: 
3:00 p.m. -
4:00 p.m. 
5:00 p.m. 
6:00 p.m. 
7:00 p.m. 
8:00 p.m. 
9:00 p.m. 
3: 59 p.m. 
4:59 p.m. 
5:59 p.m. 
6:59 p.m. 
7:59 p.m. 
8:59 p.m. 
9: 59 p. m. 
10:00 p.m. - 10:59 p.m. 
Subtotals: 
Night Shift: 
11:00 p.m. - 11:59 p.m. 
12:00 mid. - 12:59 a.m. 
1:00 a.m. - 1:59 a.m. 
2:00 a.m. - 2:59 a.m. 
3:00 a.m. - 3:59 a.m. 
4:00 a.m. - 4:59 a.m. 
5:00 a.m. - 5:59 a.m. 
6:00 a.m. - 6:59 a.m. 
Subtotals: 
TOTALS: 
Standard Deviation: 132.45 
Frequency 
227 
324 
299 
309 
322 
322 
419 
408 
2630 
376 
438 
431 
427 
441 
478 
538 
529 
3656 
547 
415 
339 
242 
163 
124 
110 
100 
2040 
8326 
Chi-Square: 2.6 at 21 degrees of freedom 
Significance: .01 
Relative 
Percentage 
2.7 
3.9 
3.6 
3.7 
,.. n 
,;).":1 
3.9 
5.0 
4.9 
31% 
4.5 
5.3 
5.2 
5.1 
5.3 
5.7 
6.5 
6.4 
44% 
6.6 
5.0 
4.1 
2.9 
2.0 
1.5 
1.3 
1.2 
25% 
100% 
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the conclusion that a systematic relationship does not exist between 
shifts, hence the variables of shift hours and calls for service are 
independent. Further, observation reveals that 44 percent of the 
calls occur on the afternoon shift and that the hours of 9:00 p.m. to 
12:00 midnight are the peak time of police demands. This follows a 
national pattern. 17 
Comparing different shift assignments by calls for service, it is 
observed that the existing shift times are not the most equitable in 
terms of workload. See Table VIII. While the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 
shift rotation appears to have a more equalized percentage, it is 
important to realize that this data only reflects a single variable 
frequency. A much better shift scheme can be realized by plotting a 
multiple variable conglomerate against each shift rotation. If the 
multiple response indices are tabulated for hourly workload, segmented 
into shift rotations and computed for least within-shift variation; a 
more accurate diagram of equalized workload will appear. Figure 5 
displays such a computation. 
Donald T. Shanahan indicated that if optimum change-of-shift time 
should be on such non-traditional hours, such as exhibited in this 
data and in Figure 5, the difference in variance may be so minor that 
what might be gained in efficiency would be lost in personnel morale 
and organizational conf1ict. 18 It should be strongly noted that the 
4:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon shift rotation reveals the least percent of 
within-shift variance, however, the difference from that of the 
current 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. rotation is only three points. Under 
these circumstances, the data would suggest that current shift hours 
be maintained, and that alternative strategies be employed to allow 
TABLE VIII 
SHIFT ASSIGNMENT BY CALLS FOR SERVICE, 1980 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Frequency Relative Percentage 
5 a.m. - 1 p.m. 2013 24 
1 p.m. - 9 p.m. 3418 41 
9 p.m. - 5 a.m. 2895 35 
6 a.m. - 2 p.m. 2322 28 
2 p.m. - 10 p.m. 3537 42 
10 p.m. - 2 a.m. 2569 30 
7 a.m. - 3 p.m. 2630 31 
3 p.m. - 11 p.m. 3656 44 
11 p.m. - 3 a.m. 2040 25 
8 a.m. - 4 p.m. 2779 33 
4 p.m. - 12 mid. 3827 46 
12 mid. - 8 a.m. 1720 21 
9 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2893 34 
5 p.m. - 1 a.m. 3804 46 
1 a.m. - 9 a.m. 1629 20 
10 a.m. - 6 p.m. 3025 36 
6 p.m. - 2 a.m. 3712 45 
2 a.m. - 10 a.m. 1589 19 
126 
Percent of 
Variance 
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Figure 5. Histogram: Least Variance of Multiple 
Response Indices by Shift Schedule 
78 
0600 
1400 
2200 
for more officers on the afternoon or swing shift to handle the 
increased workload. 
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31 
0700 
1500 
2300 
As Warren G. Bennis so aptly put it, successful change within an 
organization is dependent on the ability to identify and mold 
"strategic variables" such as the "resistance and adaptation" to a 
planned move. 19 The realization that police officers are people and 
that production is a behavior, counters strict decisions made on 
quantification alone. People-oriented managers need to balance 
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decisions between people and production. The long-range result will 
usually be maximum benefits. Changing shift rotation to the 4:00 a.m • 
. 
to 12:00 ncon scheme would have drastic organizational affects. The 
7-3-11 shift change should be maintained. 
Sector Requirements and Design. There are currently four patrol 
sectors existing in the Jonesb~ro city limits. The boundaries for 
these sectors have been so established for over five years. There has 
never been a statistical study or justification for the design of 
patrol sectors within the city. Major roadways are the boundaries for 
each district and the city is divided into somewhat equal geographical 
areas, comprised of sectors north, east, west, and middle. Figure 6 
displays a map of the City of Jonesboro by sector. 
These established sector boundaries can be easily moved to 
accommodate change that would result in improvement for one or more of 
the following conditions: 
1. Improved response time average for a given sector. 
2. Decrease in dispatches of police units outside of their 
assigned sector. 
3. Increased officer safety by increased back-up units. 
4. Decrease in gas consumption because of efficient manpower 
deployment regarding travel time to known high police service 
areas. 
5. Improved administration through consolidation of sectors. 
6. Equalized workload balance among patrol officers. 
As discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation, extensive work 
has been done on the development of complex deployment designs by use 
of computer modeling, probability factors, and travel-time schemes. 
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One focus of this study centers on the design of patrol sectors based 
on criteria established in multiple response indices by the police 
manager. 
The first step in accomplishing this task is generated in the 
establishment of 57 one and one-half inch square geographical loca-
tions representing .5 square miles of the city. The multiple response 
index for each of these geographical locations is tabulated. 
For a simplified explanation of the multiple response index 
calculation performed by the SPSS subprogram Multiple Response 
Analysis, Table IX is presented. 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test is selected to test whether the four 
independent, sector geographical locations are from different 
populations; or if the workload between sectors is proportionately 
different between medians. Each Multiple Response Index is tabulated 
and ranked from 1 to N. The value of R (the sum of ranks) for each of 
the sector multiple response indices are then determined. 
The approach procedure for making a decision as to the acceptance 
or rejection of the null hypothesis is strictly followed as presented 
in objective statistical tests in research. 20 Hence, Table X is 
presented and the following method is employed. 
As previvus1y stated, it was hypothesized that the medians of the 
multiple response index population are equal. This hypothesis 
describes a relationship between the four existing multiple response 
indices, correspondingly, one to each district currently employed by 
the Jonesboro Police Department. 
H was computed by means of the formula: 2l 
MRI = TYPE OF INCIDENT 
TABLE IX 
COMPUTATION OF MULTIPLE RESPONSE INDEX PER CALL* 
(8,326 police calls) 
+ PRIORITY + ARREST + COVER 
5(weight) X 4(factor) + 3(weight) X 3(factor) + 3(weight) X 2(factor) + 2(weight) X l(factor) 
4(weight) X " + 2(weight) X " + 2(weight) X " + l(weight) X 
3(weight) X " + l(weight) X " + l(weight) X " 
2(weight) X " 
l(weight) X " 
* This is a simplified theoretical explanation of the MRI value for each of the 8,326 calls. 
The summation of these values are tabulated for each of the 57 geographical locations com-
prising the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas. 
" 
w 
--' 
NORTH 
MR.I 
2.38 
12.56 
22.87 
.70 
25.89 
.27 
.87 
.75 
. 78 
.08 
15.46 
6.63 
3.68 
N=13 
TABLE X 
ORIGINAL SECTOR DESIGN: MULTIPLE RESPONSE INDICES 
FOR FOUR SECTORS. DATA FOR COMPUTATIONS, 
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY RANKS. 
SECTORS 
EAST WEST 
Rank MR.I Rank MR.I Rank 
32 42.12 56 .04 2 
48 5.68 40 .19 11 
51 .63 21 .34 16 
22 4.35 39 1. 65 29 
52 10.61 46 3.18 37 
13.5 2.91 35 1.70 30 
27 8.38 43 .81 26 
24 11.81 47 .06 4 
25 2.92 36 .11 8 
6 1. 77 31 .16 10 
49 2.87 34 .07 5 
42 .20 12 .09 7 
38 .30 15 
.35 17 
.74 23 
1.09 28 
.05 3 
.03 1 
.14 9 
.51 19 
R1=429.5 N=20 R2=555 N=12 R3=185 
MIDDLE 
HRI 
54.43 
17.68 
26.31 
9.93 
26.32 
6.49 
8.46 
.27 
.46 
28.25 
.75 
2.51 
N=12 
Rank 
57 
50 
53 
45 
54 
41 
44 
13.5 
18 
55 
24 
33 
R4=487.5 
--' 
W 
N 
k R.2 
12 L 1 3 (N+1) H = N(N+l) Ni 
i = 1 
1 -2: T 
N3 - N 
Where Ni and N represent the number of cases in the ith 
category and in the total sample respectively. The denominator 
represents a correction for ties, where 
T. = t. 3 - t. 
1 1 1 
t; being given the number of observations tied for a given rank. 
Hence, the calculation of H for the original sector design of 
Jonesboro, Arkansas is: 
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12 
H = 3,306 [ 
2 2 2 2J (429.5) + (555.0) + (185.0) + (487.5) 
13 20 12 12 
= ~1~2~ 
3,306 (52,248.01 - 174) 
= 189.64 - 174 
it = 15.64 
Correction for ties 
15.64 
H = 1 6 
(573-57) 
- 174 
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Referring to a chi square table,22 for 3 degrees of freedom 
(k-1), a chi square of 7.82 or larger is needed to obtain significance 
at the .05 level. Since an H of 15.64 was obtained from calculation 
of original sector design (multiple response indices), a decision is 
made to reject the null hypothesis. 
Thus, the medians of the multiple response indices are not equal, 
displaying large discrepancies in workload between sectors. Observa-
tion of Table X and a calculated H of 15.64 statistically indicate 
that at least one sector median is disproportionately greater than the 
others. From a management perspective, this interprets into varied 
workload for officers as well as increased gas resources to cover 
"busy" patrol units. A more equitable workload between sectors is 
desired, if possible due to geographical considerations. 
By manipulating the current sector boundaries in an attempt to 
equalize MRI workload, the Kruskal-Wa1lis Test can again be employed 
to test population medians. Further, a comparative analysis between 
the two test runs can be conducted until a lower value of H is deter-
mined. The maximum statistical goal is to achieve an H which is lower 
than a chi square of 7.82 at 3 degrees of freedom, taking into account 
sector barriers and geographical design. 
A proposed sector design is revealed in Figure 7. By dropping 
the southern boundary of North Sector by one-half mile and extending 
the Eastern boundary of Middle Sector by one-half mile, four new 
patrol districts can be made which are geographically sound, similar 
in population density, and alike in beat area. 
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If the same procedures utilized to calculate the Kruska1-Wa11is 
Test are employed for the new proposed design, a second value of H can 
be computed. It is important to note that each geographical grid was 
originally designed to be bound by major streets and thoroughfares in 
anticipation of patrol sector redesign. The same geographical grids 
were used and none were split or manipulated in any way. Only the 
summation or number of grids within each sector changed as boundaries 
were moved to include or exclude new or old geographical locations. 
Table XI is presented to show the data derived from the proposed 
sector design. It is important to note that North sector has 
increased in number of geographical locations as all others have 
decreased; subsequently beat area has followed the same pattern. 
Again employing the scientific method for approved research pro-
cedures in computing the Kruskal-Wal1is Test, it is observed that a 
much lower H is achieved. In fact, an H of 3.94 is computed. 
Referring to a chi square tab1e,23 for 3 degrees of freedom (k-1), a 
chi square of 7.82 or larger is needed to obtain significance at the 
.05 level. Since an H of 3.94 was obtained, a decision not to reject 
the null hypothesis is supported. 
From this decision it is possible to conclude that there is no 
meaningful difference between sector medians (or between sector MRI 
workload); and certainly no statistical difference as an H of 3.94 
approaches a .30 probability factor that random error has no effect on 
data re-examination. 
Therefore, in comparing the proposed sector design to the 
original design, a more equal workload balance among patrol officers 
is statistically proven. 
NORTH 
MR.I 
2.38 
28.25 
12.56 
22.87 
.70 
25.89 
.27 
.87 
.75 
.78 
.08 
.05 
1.09 
.14 
.06 
.11 
.04 
.07 
, N=18 
TABLE XI 
PROPOSED SECTOR DESIGN: MULTIPLE RESPONSE INDICES FOR 
FOUR SECTORS. DATA FOR COMPUTATIONS, 
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY RANKS. 
SECTORS 
EAST WEST MIDDLE 
Rank MR.I Rank MR.I Rank MRI Rank l 
32 '42.12 56 .19 11 54.43 57 
55 5.68 40 .34 16 17.68 50 
48 .63 21 1.64 29 6.49 41 
51 4.35 39 3.18 37 26.31 53 
22 15.46 49 2.51 33 8.46 44 
52 10.61 46 1. 70 30 .61 20 
13.5 2.91 35 26.32 54 9.93 45 
27 8.38 43 6.63 42 .46 18 
24 11.81 47 3.68 38 .27 13.5 
25 2.92 36 .81 26 .09 7 
6 1. 77 31 .16 10 
3 2.87 34 
28 .20 12 
9 .30 15 
4 .35 17 
8 .74 23 
2 .03 1 
5 .51 19 
R1=414.5 N=18 R2=564 N=ll R3=326 N=10 R4=348.5 
W 
'-J 
In support of this conclusion, an analysis of response time by 
sector is conducted. After determining individual sector response 
times within the original design, the data is manipulated to reflect 
the new locations of the proposed design ~y sector. The results are 
displayed by Table XII. 
l~ 
Even though the mean average response times are lower for the 
proposed sector design, the relationships appear to be somewhat 
spurious. Since all data was taken from the year 1980, and response 
times calculated from the elapsed time a police unit was dispatched to 
the time it arrived, the boundaries of sectors had little or no 
affect. In reality, if the North Sector unit was dispatched to a 
call, it made no difference in elapsed time to arrival no matter if 
the call was within that particular sector or crossed several sector 
boundaries. Therefore, what these times reflect is the number of 
dispatched calls out of sector; since those call locations absorbed 
into different sectors were not calculated for the proposed sector 
response times. 
Hence, it can be hypothesized that the frequency of outside 
sector call dispatches will decrease with implementation of the pro-
posed sector design. From a practical sense, this interprets into 
increased officer safety as back-up units will have a higher proba-
bility of being closer to their respective sectors; and a savings in 
gas resource funds as patrol cars will be traveling less distance to 
dispatched calls. 
Determination of Patrol Strategy 
In the preceding discussion, several criteria for the allocation 
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TABLE XII 
ORIGINAL VS PROPOSED SECTOR DESIGN: RESPONSE TIMES 
ORIGINAL DESIGN 
North Sector 4 minutes 26 seconds 
East Sector 4 minutes 46 seconds 
West Sector 5 minutes 28 seconds 
Middle Sector 4 minutes 16 seconds 
MEAN 4 minutes 44 seconds 
PROPOSED DESIGN 
North Sector 4 minutes 33 seconds 
East Sector 4 minutes 31 seconds 
Hest Sector 4 minutes 50 seconds 
Middle Sector 3 minutes 42 seconds 
MEAN 4 minutes 24 seconds 
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of police manpower by equalization of workload was established for the 
Jonesboro Police Department. An assignment-availability factor was 
determined, shift rotational schemes were discussed and maintained, 
month and day workload variations were studied, and a new sector 
design was proposed for the Jonesboro community. To this point, the 
emphasis on decision-making has been limited to direct input from the 
manager as to the establishment of multiple response indices. These 
inputs have acted as parameters for the careful analysis of deter-
mining a patrol allocation plan. Equally important to the adminis-
trator is the selection of a patrol strategy. As used here, patrol 
strategy refers to the particular combination of sector structure, 
area patrol coverage, and number of response or preventive force units 
which are being used in a police district each working period. 24 
The purpose of this presentation is to discuss the relative merits of 
some patrol strategies in an attempt to suggest an enforcement method 
which will mold with the unique features of the established allocation 
plan for Jonesboro, Arkansas. The goal being to design an optimum 
manpower distribution, coupling allocation plan and patrol strategy, 
based on multiple response indices established by the police manager. 
Fixed Sector Patrol. This patrol strategy is the typical beat 
structure in common use today and is exhibited in Jonesboro, Arkansas 
as it is in most cities. One patrol unit is assigned to each sector 
with no overlapping boundaries; however, patrol officers are fre-
quently dispatched across boundaries when the need arises. The Fixed 
Sector Patrol technique is the traditional police reponse to random 
moving patrol cars in an attempt to deter crime. Officers are 
expected to answer any type of call or incident that occurs within 
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their respective sectors. There are no special units which handle 
certain calls (excluding traffic accident investigation and selective 
enforcement) and thus, each officer is responsible for his district. 
In theory, Fixed Sector Patrol operates on the conclusion that 
crime occurs randomly over a given geographical area; and that a 
patrol car can give all parts of a specific district some patrol 
coverage or protection by moving randomly throughout the sectoi when 
not answering calls. In Chapter I of this dissertation, the concept 
of the random moving patrol car and crime deterrence received con-
siderable question. 
An additional premise promoted by Fixed Sector Patrol is 
equalization of workload and response time. The idea that workload 
can be evenly distributed by slicing a given area into districts is 
only partly correct. As described in the previous chapter, the City 
of Jonesboro was indeed segmented into relatively similar size sectors 
and workload was proven to be statistically uniform between these 
sectors. However, the workload per officer will continue to fluctuate 
unevenly between shifts. Considering that Jonesboro reflected a 
national trend of most police demand occurring between 9:00 p.m. and 
12:00 midmight, it must be assumed that those officers working the 
afternoon shift (swing) will carry a much higher workload than those 
on the other two shifts. This is highly supported in Table VII. This 
is not meant to subjugate the Kruskal-Wallis Test analysis conducted 
earlier, only qualify and refine it. The researcher emphasizes that 
given this patrol technique, it appears that the best possible sector 
design was proposed. 
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Further, Fixed Sector Patrol advocates assume that a number of 
districts will insure a high probability that any person calling for 
help within the city will not be too far away from a patrol car for a 
quick response. Donald Shanahan points out an interesting phenome-
non. He states that there is a "built-in conflict" between area, 
response time, and balanced sector workload in cases where some 
sectors have a high popuiation density and others have a low popula-
tion density.25 If beats are designed so as to equalize work loads, 
those in low population density areas will be much larger and have 
longer response times. If they are designed to have roughly equal 
areas in order to make travel times equal, the high population density 
beats will have a much higher workload than the low density beats. 
While substantively correct, Shanahan fails to address small urban 
centers, such as Jonesboro. Additionally, the proposed sector design 
reflects four districts having extremely close area size and shape. 
Again, these arguments are not presented to undermine the statistical 
significance of the preceding discussion, only to refine it and 
highlight its strong points. 
In conclusion, the Fixed Sector Patrol remains the classic tech-
nique in most cities. It has been tested, measured, and simulated 
many times by man and computer and still remains worthy in terms of 
patrol criteria. 26 
Magnetic Beat Patrol. A second patrol method discussed is called 
"Magnetic Beat Patrol." This strategy was adopted by the Chicago 
Police Department in 1968 and is named after the "magnetic" affect 
high call beats have in "drawing" police calls to specific geographi-
cal 10cations.27 In order to maintain a somewhat uniform patrol, 
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the procedure calls for police units to remain in the sector in which 
it last answered a call. The theoretical concept being that high call 
beats will attract cars where the need is greatest. 
Under a light workload, the magnetic effect is not as predominant 
as with a heavy workload. Although the Chicago Police Department has 
had relative success in this patrol technique, it is questionable if 
criteria such as response time and travel distance to ~magnet1c" areas 
would greatly influence a small city jurisdiction having only four 
sectors. 
Directed Patrol. Directed Patrol is a program developed by 
officers of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department. 28 It has a 
primary goal of reducing specific crimes, usually residential burglary 
or armed robbery, in a given geographical location. The technique is 
often referred to as a meld of saturation patrol (flooding an area 
with police officers) and crime analysis (information indicating a 
pattern of specific criminal activity). Thus, officers are "directed" 
to patrol a specific location for a specific period of time in an 
attempt to apprehend or deter specific criminal types. 
One of the characteristics of directed patrol is the implementa-
tion of a deployment system whereby workload is managed more effec-
tively. Two methods are employed to allow more control of workload 
and reduce response time, thereby increasing the probability of 
apprehending a criminal as the act is occurring. First, calls are 
assigned a series of classifications based strictly on the priorities 
of: (1) Is the crime in progress? (2) Are the perpetrators present 
in the area? Secondly, the deployment system allows watch commanders 
and sector sergeants the flexibility to deploy resources according to 
need within the present sector boundaries. It is quite obvious that 
the emphasis in Directed Patrol is on apprehension of criminals 
leading to the decrease of crime. 
Directed Patrol, theoretically addresses the traditional police 
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role of "criminal-catcher." It places little importance on the 
service aspect of police work, and concentrates on high crime rate 
areas. Crime specific analysis is an integral component to the 
program, as it provides continuous, detailed, and timely crime pattern 
information on which to support manpower deployment. 
The inherent drawback to Directed Patrol is in police-community 
relations. Dnly a small percentage of the populus receive the 
greatest amount of police service. Equity of general police service 
to the community is sacrificed for an attempt to apprehend criminals 
by reduced response times. Capturing the essence of this discussion, 
Gourley and Bristow write: 
Many patrol administrators who succumb to the temptation of con-
centrating patrolmen in high-crime areas are taken to task by 
merchants or citizens in light-crime areas, when patrolmen 
continually show excessive response time to their infrequent 
calls. 29 
Such a condition would only be exaggerated in a small city where 
manpower and resources are severely limited. Directed Patrol offers 
guidance in those infrequent times that small urban centers experience 
a rash of specific crimes in specific areas. However, as a full time 
patrol strategy, it fails to meet the overall needs of a smaller 
jurisdiction. 
Team Policing. 3D Team policing is a term that has meant some-
thing different in every city in which it has been tried. The 
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variations in style and form have been as numerous as the experi-
menters. In the past ten years, police jurisdictions such as Richmond, 
California; Multnomah County, Oregon; Dayton, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; 
Los Angeles, California; and New York City have implemented some 
concept of team policing. 
It will not be the purpose of this discussion to evaluate each 
experience~ but to examine those operational elements of team policing 
which appeared somewhat uniform within each case; and which differ from 
conventional patrol concepts. These elements are: geographic 
stability of patrol, maximum interaction among team members, and 
maximum communication among team members and the community. 
Geographic stability of patrol means the permanent assignment of 
teams of police to small neighborhoods. The geographic stability of 
patrol is the basic element to team policing. In small cities, such as 
Jonesboro, Arkansas, the entire city can be viewed as one large 
neighborhood and the police department divided into "teams" by shift. 
In any case, officers approach the patrol function in a team manner, 
i.e. there may be detectives on patrol and officers in undercover 
assignments, or there may be no marked police cars, or patrol is 
directed to specific areas only. Inherent in the team policing concept 
is autonomous responsibility of teams to the type and style of police 
services provided to the neighborhood. 
Maximum interaction among team members, including internal 
communication among officers assigned to an area during a 24-hour 
period, seven days a week is another feature of team policing. The 
element of encouraging interaction among team members is an essential 
component to the strategy. Implicit in this concept of maximum 
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interaction is exchange of information. One of the techniques, within 
team policing, of accomplishing this exchange is through the scheduling 
of team conferences at regular intervals. The purpose of these 
meetings is to describe the difficult problems or incidents of the 
previous week and to discuss them with other officers, soliciting 
criticism and advice. This technique is based on the approach that 
continuing police problems cover more than one shift and one area and 
required cooperation among several police officers. Another critical 
factor in the communication process is the team leader. It is his 
responsibility to encourage the sharing of information and instill a 
sense of teamsmanship. 
The third common element in team policing ventures is maximum 
communication among team members and the community. This is again 
facilitated by meetings, only this time between teams and the 
community. The purpose is to emphasize cooperative aspects of the 
peacekeeping function, open lines of information, and identify 
neighborhood problems. These conferences act as the vehicle for 
eliciting community involvement in the police function. Another 
technique is accomplished through auxiliary patrols, ride-along 
programs, and community voice in police policy making. Finally, 
maximum communication among teams and the community is enhanced by an 
efficient system of referral on non-police problems (e.g. emotional 
problems, abandoned cars, drug addiction, alcoholic rehabilitation) to 
appropriate service agencies. These participative programs are an 
important part in team policing as they are designed to bring the 
police and the community together in a spirit of cooperation. 
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Undoubtedly, team policing concepts address the ideals of police 
work. However, all too often, the ideals require a surplus of money, 
resources, and manpower. Each police department has a different 
history and different conditions of such resources as monetary funds, 
leadership, community support, integrity and initiative. The Jonesboro 
Police Department is no exception. Even though no complete and 
methodologically sound evaluation of team policing is currently avail-
able in the literature, there are at least three findings concerning 
team policing which have been noted. 3l First, the community attitude 
toward it has proven to be outstanding, however, the patrol officer's 
belief is negative to it. Sherman captured the idea when he stated, 
"the community loves it and the patrolmen hate it."32 This is only 
natural, as community leaders and participants are allowed (for the 
first real time) to observe the police function and be part of it. The 
disadvantage is in police officer perceptions. For team policing to be 
successful, the officers involved must be cooperative and 
enthusiastic. If they observe the program to be a ruse for police 
administrators in appeasing community pressures (as observed in several 
incidents), then the ensuing cynical and non-productive attitude 
greatly detracts from the strategy. Second, the political arena of a 
city has much to do with the decision to implement team policing. It 
can be viewed as a "gamble," for many politicians, who wish to use the 
police as an instrument to show success or failure. And finally, team 
policing has exhibited the need for immediate access to quantities of 
specific resources (money, technical equipment, cars, and manpower) to 
be successful. Then too, the argument arises that if such resources 
were applied to traditional police methods, would not they also be as 
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successful? The dilemma remains; team policing takes resources. For 
small urban centers such as Jonesboro, a feasibility issue would be 
prime concern before the implementation of this patrol strategy. 
Split-Force Patrol. 33 The Split-Force Patrol concept is a 
relatively recent development in the field of law enforcement and has 
been implemented in only a few police departments in the United 
States. The first agency to implement split-force patrol on a wide-
scale basis was Wilmington, Delaware Police Department. 
Split-Force Patrol is uniquely different from traditional patrol 
concepts in that it "splits" or "divides" the patrol force into two 
distinct and separate functions. Under the strategy, one part of the 
patrol force is assigned to respond to calls for service, investigate 
crimes, and perform other assigned apprehension duties. Another part 
of the patrol force is held in reserve for the express purpose of 
conduting preventative patrol, or as a deterrent agent. There are, of 
course, times when this distraction cannot be maintained and all units 
are required to respond to calls. The primary intent, however, is for 
one portion of the force to be devoted exclusively to prevention and 
deterrence techniques. 
Charles D. Hale notes that the primary advantage of split-force 
patrol is that it allows more attention to be devoted to preventative 
patrol activities and that officers are assigned this function as a 
primary responsibility.34 Under traditional patrol methods, preven-
tative patrol is usually something that is done when time permits and 
after other ob1igations have been satisfied. Consequently, preven-
tative patrol under normal patrol procedures does not always receive 
the attention it deserves. 35 
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Further, substantial evaluation of the split-force experiment in 
Wilmington reveals several int~resting conclusions. 36 First, 
response time decreased as those assigned to apprehension patrol 
usually lingered in high-crime or high police demand areas. Second, 
arrest-related productivity increased. And finally, police 
professionalism, attitude, morale, and accountability increased. 
At a single glance, split-force patrol appears to be a highly 
advantageous and desirable patrol strategy for any jurisdiction. 
However, a closer inspection reveals that split-patrol is, in essence, 
a combination of directed patrol activity and traditional patrol 
techniques. It requires, without a doubt, excessive amounts of 
manpower and resources. Further, from a theoretical standpoint, pre-
ventive patrol is derived from the concept that the omnipresence of the 
uniform officer prevents crime. Experiments in Kansas City and other 
observations conclude that this may not be correct. 37 The presence 
of uniform officers has a tendency to displace not prevent, crime. As 
C. Ray Jeffery concluded in his well-respected work on crime preven-
tion, the factors of certainty in detection and arrest, swiftness of 
action, and sureness of punishment must be present for deterrence to be 
effective. 38 
Split-Patrol Force appears to be a workable compromise between 
directed and preventive patrol. On one hands the use of crime analysis 
is provided to detect patterns of crimes--their location, type, 
frequency, and timing--so that directed patrol can focus on such 
affected sites, thereby supporting the idea that most crime does not 
happen randomly. And on the other hand, random-moving, preventive 
patrol is assigned to increase police visabi1ity in hopes to deter such 
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activity. The Split-Patrol Force assumes that some crime occurs 
randomly and some does not. It appears to be successful in those 
jurisdictions mentioned and may provide a feasible strategy for small 
cities like Jonesboro, Arkansas. 
Tactical Patrol. The final patrol strategy to be discussed is 
actually a conglomerate of three techniques, either used singularly or 
in conjunction with one another. The procedures all utilize a small 
sample of the overall police patrol force to provide a special patrol 
unit. This patrol factor can either be a permanent assignment where 
those chosen in the Tactical Patrol Force remain for extended periods 
of time or they may be rotational by month, week, day, or even shift. 
Where small cities are involved or where the number of sectors is 
limited, it is more advantageous to have rotational assignments. 
However, this will be discussed later. The three techniques are 
embodied in flexible shift patrol, fluid overlay patrol, and "wild" car 
patrol. 
Flexible Shift Patrol. This aspect of the tactical patrol 
procedure allows for a group or unit of officers to be assigned to an 
lIoverlay" shift. In other words, if the normal assignment hours are 
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., then the flexible shift patrol 
force may be assigned to a 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift. The goal 
being to maximize the number of officers in a patrol capacity during 
the hours of peak demand. In most instances, the flexible shift patrol 
is also a fluid overlay. 
Fluid Overlay Patrol. The fluid overlay patrol technique was 
first explored in Tucson, Arizona in the late 1960's.39 It provides 
for a patrol force to act not only as a shift overlay, but also as a 
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sector overlay. The fluid overlay patrol procedure allows for manpower 
to support the regular patrol sectors. Officers in the fluid overlay 
units are assigned in relative proportion to anticipated needs in a 
specific geographical area. 
Ideally, this unit would act in conjunction with the major body of 
patrol force personnel to perform enforcement and apprehension 
activities. In a recent evaluation of this technique, overall response 
to calls and response time to high priority calls were greatly improved 
over traditional patrol methods. 40 The fundamental technique 
employed here, is again a combination of directed patrol and split 
patrol theory; the difference being only a fraction of the patrol force 
is involved (one or two units). The tactical unit often being referred 
to as a "wild" car, "trouble" car, "hot" car, or "felony" car. 
"Wild" Car Patrol. The theoretical implications involved here are 
based on the directed patrol concept--crime does not happen randomly. 
The "wild" car is a shift and sector overlay unit which does not 
respond to routine calls of a non-criminal nature. It is held in 
reserve, assigned to the high-crime and high-demand areas and times. 
The "wild" car is primarily responsible for support of sector 
officers. This means that the "wild" car responds to all major crimes 
in progress and other emergencies. The "wild" car is utilized to 
maximize officer presence at a scene quickly, for this reason the unit 
is always two-man. 
In actuality, the "wild" car performs three functions. First, it 
is primarily a major enforcement unit responding to all "hot" calls. 
Because it is two-man, it maximizes officer presence in a mobile 
state. Second, the "wild" car is assigned to high-crime areas and is a 
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marked patrol unit. It serves in a preventative or deterrence capacity 
when not deployed. Lastly, the "wild" car acts as relief and support 
to sector officers. This enables officers to take the extra time to do 
a good report, or a thorough investigation, or to take a dinner break 
on a busy night, without the annoying thought that a sector is empty 
and back-up is a long distance away. With a "wild" car, there should 
always be a centrally located unit for emergency response, except in 
those extremely busy nights. 
The Tactical Patrol Force offers several benefits along with 
increased response time. First, the procedures allow a squad sergeant 
to rotate and change the patrol assignments within a geographical 
area--thus allowing an individual to become thoroughly familiar with 
the entire precinct or jurisdiction. This also allows an evening of 
workload among officers over a long span of time as no one is 
permanently assigned a high demand sector. Second, the two-man "wild" 
car technique allows for a natural "training" ground. A rookie can be 
"broken in" and experience the job with the knowledge of a veteran at 
his side. This maximizes manpower use. Third, the "wild" car can be 
utilized for special assignments or details without affecting the rest 
of the shift. If a stake-out is needed, or special crowd control, the 
"wild" car is always available. What must be emphasized is that the 
"wild" car is a complement to the traditional, fixed sector patrol 
design. Fourth, this procedure reduces calls for back-up as two 
officers are present in the same car, responding to "hot" calls. This 
interprets into direct savings in vehicle maintenance and gas consump-
tion as units are no longer required to travel long distances in 
support of one another. Fifth, the two man car provides officer safety 
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benefits; not only within the "wild" car, but also to that unit 
requesting back-up. Some agencies attempt to pair a sergeant with an 
officer in the "wild" car in an attempt to always have a supervisor 
immediately at the scene of a major incident. An excellent side 
benefit to this technique, is the ability to directly supervise and 
motivate those officers who do not produce alone or in one-man cars. 
Additionally, by rotating monthly, morale is kept high by each officer 
working the "wild" car and informally getting to know the sergeant in a 
direct working situation. Sixth, the "wild" car is a shift overlay 
which allows for at least some patrol coverage in the community during 
shift change. This is especially important during the afternoon-night 
shift periods of 10:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. as this is usually the time of 
peak demand and priority calls. As exhibited in Jonesboro, the 
11:00 p.m. shift change hour is the single highest hour for police call 
frequency and workload. And finally, the tactical patrol procedures 
allow manpower to be distributed through the totai participation of an 
organization. By coordinating detective and uniform information, the 
"wild" car is dispersed to areas of "most need." If one officer is 
sick or on vacation, a lieutenant or even a captain can function as the 
second man in the "wild" car. This not only refreshes command with the 
"street" experiences of police work, it also bridges the communication 
gap between officer and management personnel. 
Summary of Findings 
Based on the multiple response indices of geographical locations 
within the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas, the following relationships 
were discovered. 
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First, the need for twenty-four hour police protection required 
the establishment of an assignment-availability factor in determining 
patrol strength. For the Jonesboro Police Department to man one 
sector seven days a week, 365 days a year computed to a 1.85 factor 
based on the unique circumstances of number of days off, number of 
vacation days, number of days training, etc., due to loss of officer 
time. Practically speaking, this interpreted into a need of six 
officers per sector for a twenty-four hour time period; or a total of 
30 officers available for patrol activity to provide services to the 
Jonesboro community. 
In order to determine shift hours, the number of calls by month 
and day was studied. There appeared to be little variance between 
months as the standard deviation of calls by month was low. However, 
in comparison, there was extreme deviation between days of the week. 
A plot of multiple response indices by day graphically revealed that 
Friday and Saturday required more police manpower needs as their 
respective workload nearly doubled that of any other day. 
In selecting shift hours, an extremely low chi square and high 
variance supported the conclusion that the variables of calls for 
service and shift rotation were independent. Further observation 
revealed that the peak hours of police activity occurred between the 
hours of 9:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight. A plot of within-shift 
variance by shift rotation schemes displayed that the current assign-
ments of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. were most beneficial for 
people-oriented production such as exhibited in the Jonesboro Police 
Department. 
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Further, a new sector design was compared to current sector 
design by use of the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance by Ranks in 
order to show equalization of workload between patrol districts. The 
current design was found to have an H value of 15.64 which exceeded 
the 7.82 rejection region at an alpha of .05. However, the proposed 
design calculated to an H value of 3.94 at the same rejection level. 
While significance at 15.64 rejected the null hypothesis, the proposed 
design supported the concept that the medians of the multiple response 
index populations were equal; or that the MRI workload was more evenly 
balanced between sectors. In additional support to this finding, mean 
response time for the new sector design was found to be 20 seconds 
lower, indicating an increase in police officer safety and a decrease 
in gas resource expenditures. 
Finally, several patrol strategies and techniques were 
explored--fixed sector patrol, magnetic beat patrol, directed patrol, 
team policing, split-force patrol, and tactical patrol. All have an 
advantage under circumstances, and none can be said to be the "best" 
approach all the time. The police administrator must manage and 
select a strategy which uniquely fits his conditions. He must have a 
keenly developed sense of cost effectiveness as there will be a finite 
amount of resources allocated to his task. He must follow a cal-
cu1ated and systematic method for decision-making that will result in 
the fulfillment of the department's needs. And most important, the 
police administrator must be adaptable and flexible in selecting an 
r 
urban patrol strategy. Policing requires a complex mix of forces to 
attack the myriad of problems facing a community. The demands for 
quick police response, suppressed criminal activity, and political 
expenditure justification require the development of a force-in-
combination that engages a number of distinct police elements in a 
coordinated, cooperative, and consistent manner. 4l 
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These findings, considered together, support the conclusion that 
the new, proposed sector design matched with a tactical patrol 
strategy would improve officer efficiency (by equalizing workload) in 
the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas. Appendix A offers a list of 
recommendations for Jonesboro as well as an optimum design plan. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
The method designed in this study is an approach to combining 
decision-making elements regarding the deployment of police patrol 
manpower. The City of Jonesboro, Arkansas was used as a subject to 
demonstrate this model. 
An objective of social science research is to generalize findings 
or stimulate research in othf:i' populations, other places, and other 
times than those sampled for study itself ••• so it is with this 
dissertation. The method presented herein is a process that can be 
utilized in similar cities with similar problems. The logical 
inferences drawn from this deployment method suggest an approach which 
is highly useful and marketable in today's conditions. Small urban 
centers are provided a method for achieving an optimum deployment plan 
based on the total participation of the police department, considering 
the political, economic, cultural, and social environment of that 
unique community. 
However, this treatise explores a much broader set of theoretical 
perspectives than those initiated by patrol deployment. The 
development of a new decision-making model (Integrated Management 
Decision-Making) exposes the need for major changes in police 
management thinking. 
First, the relationship between the "learning" approach to 
decision-making and the management of police organizations must be 
fully addressed. Police managers must be aware that their organiza-
tions are drastically influenced by a circular and dynamic 
relationship between the organization and the environment. Further, 
police managers must assume that information exchange within this 
relationship is directly correlated to a continuous, evolving, and 
prescriptive input for exploring alternative future for 
decision-making. This tenous relationship between organization and 
environment can be viewed as an educational strategy to cope with 
change. Organizations learn to become capable of transformation and 
adaptation by restructuring to fit the environment. In essence, this 
is the decision-making process--learning to integrate organization 
with environment and vise-versa. 
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Second, administrators must consider the police organization from 
a total systems concept. It is both a system with vital components 
and parts as well as a subsystem of a much greater environment. The 
way in which the organization integrates with the other segments of 
this environment determine the accomplishment and effectiveness of 
specific objectives. For this reason, political, economic, cultural, 
racial, legal, and industrial influences must be considered during 
internal policy changes which alter the police function. Tradi-
tionally, police managers have not fully understood nor considered the 
police role as an integral part of the environment. For example, in 
Jonesboro, the redesign of patrol deployment in that city produced a 
wide variety of consequences. The documented need for more police 
officers placed an economic burden on the city government, which in 
turn, stimulated a political argument concerning overexpenditure, all 
of which was fully addressed by the local media which heightened 
public interest. Appendix B refers to this situation. 
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Indeed, the need for police administrators to address environ-
mental concerns is a primary focus of Integrated Management Decision-
making. Also, managers must change their concept of describing the 
police world. C. West Churchman explains that a major fault exhibited 
in current problem-solving approaches is the fa'ilure to think in terms 
of function and purpose. l In like manner, police managers fail to 
address the overall purpose of the police organization. Instead, they 
continually re-describe the police structure by dwelling on the 
physical world of crime rates, new police cars, civil service tests, 
etc. The natural result is a stifling of creativity, innovation, and 
futuristic thinking. Indeed, the police structure described today may 
not be the same entity that will exist in tomorrow's world. 
Further, more emphasis must be placed on the awareness of 
turbulence and change in the environment. This dissertation has 
described a very complex, dynamic, and intricate relationship between 
the environment and the police organization. There exists an 
important and critical demand to monitor and update these changes 
within the environment so that strategies can be planned to deal with 
future uncertainties and contingencies which drastically effect the 
police organization. For this reason, this study suggests the 
adoption of a separate and distinct police unit to assist management. 
Such a unit should be internal and; responsible for the monitoring and 
updating of social, cultural, economic, political, legal. industrial 
and any other environmental factor which may influence the police 
function. These units could be called "Environmental Analysis Units" 
and would provide a necessary input for the decision-making process. 
From such units, data for brainstorming adventures, knowledge surveys, 
Delphi techniques, modeling and scenarios, strategic planning, and 
other tools which stimulate imaginative thinking could be possible. 
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Of course. this would necessitate a police manager that is 
capable of an interdisciplinary approach; one that could understand 
the basic concepts of human and social interaction, one that is 
cognizant of environmental influences, one that has the capacity for 
conceptualization, abstract thinking, and one that can consider 
problems in terms of probabilities. The police manager must be an 
"expert" at listening to what others have to say and must have the 
ability to "cut through" not "muddle through" an environment where 
private interests abound. He must have the ability to tolerate 
ambiguity and confusion. He must have a propensity to innovate and 
create new alternatives to old problems. He must be able to "feel" 
what is possible and to some extent attempt to tell the future. Such 
a concept for new variation in the police management field can oniy 
occur through re-training of existing police administrators. 1n-
service training schools and management workshops are suggested to 
fulfill this task. Additionally, new police managers should possess a 
wide range of academic and work experience. The traditional concept 
of the police chief with only 30 years experience within the police 
ranks should be abandoned, as such personnel often perpetuate 
stagnation and mediocraty. 
These are not novel and radical ideas. The business world has 
addressed these concepts for the last decade. What is new is the 
application of such prescriptive thoughts to police organizations. 
Indeed, to setforth long-range planning objectives, to develop new 
concepts to deal with new problems and contingencies as well as 
formulate new steps and new procedures to deal with current situa-
tions, will require the police organization to integrate with the 
environment. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
One of the areas of exploration regarding this dissertation is 
the testing of the model presented. A prepost experimental test 
should be established as an integral part of the evaluation step 
incorporated in the method. In this manner, a refinement of the 
decision-making process can be conducted. Thus, improvements may be 
suggested, or specific aspects modified if indicated by test results, 
and implemented. 
Second, the relationship between police preventive patrol 
activity and crime prevention, deterrence, and on-scene criminal 
apprehension must be more thoroughly examined and tested. The forms 
of patrol must be assessed in relation to the allocation design and 
crime analysis technique available to a police department. 
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Third, further research in the area of predicting crime and 
volume of calls for service must be investigated so that police can be 
recruited and deployed based on more accurate knowledge of the need 
for police service in each geographic area and time period. 
And finally, the relationship between the decision-making process 
and the deployment of police patrol manpower must be a continual focus 
of further inquiry. By identifying and defining those key elements in 
the managerial process of decision-making, a more accurate set of 
objectives and goals for the police patrol function may be attained; 
thereby improving the overall performance of the police. As Magorah 
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Maruyama so eloquently stated, research should be "cata1ytic."2 It 
is the purpose of this dissertation, and the goal of Integrated 
Management Decision-Making, to encourage the individual to develop new 
types of reality-testing and problem-solving techniques. Such an 
objective, highlights the research purpose and hopefully generates new 
thought, innovation and creativity, so desperately needed in the 
police arena. 
NOTES 
1 C. West Churchman, The System Approach (New York: Dell 
Publishing Company, 1979), p. 13. 
2 Magorah Maruyama, "Human Futuristic and Urban Planning," AlP 
Journal, (September 1973), p. 346. 
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The police officer role cannot be defined. Traditional concepts 
of what a police officer should do and the qualities needed to attain 
police officer status have obviously not met conventional standards. 
However, the function of a police bureau has been set forth not only 
in written policy but also within the minds of every citizen--to 
efficiently offer service to the community, to protect the lives and 
property of others, and to do so at the minimum of monetary expenses 
on a cost-efficiency basis. 
So it is with the Jonesboro Police Department. The challenge is 
to obtain maximum efficiency and effectiveness in deploying police 
manpower resources within a limited budget. To accomplish this, an 
analysis of statistical data is necessary. 
It will be the purpose of this study to collect and analyze a 
data base by which police manpower deployment can be distributed. 
This will involve coding of every radio-dispatched police "call" for 
the year of 1980 in Jonesboro, Arkansas; and the computer-assisted 
analysis of these police responses. 
The following manpower criteria will be the discussion of 
analysis and subsequent goals for this study: 
1. Prediction of rates of calls for service. 
2. Determination of actual manpower (patrol units) needed per 
shift. 
3. Design of patrol sectors based on equalization of workload, 
priority calls, and geographical considerations. 
4. Design of a dispatch strategy based on statistical data 
presented. 
5. Design of a police dispatch radio log. 
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6. Systemization and unification of police records and reports. 
RECOMMENDATIONS - JONESBORO CITY COUNCIL 
May 4, 1981 - 7:30 p.m. 
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The following recommendations are based on an exhaustive research 
project conducted at the Jonesboro Police Department entitled, "Police 
Patrol Deployment in Urban Centers Under 100,000: A Method for 
Decision-making." They are the product of long hours of study and 
application of crime data to existing patrol conditions in Jonesboro, 
Arkansas. 
Manpower Strength. The City of Jonesboro is the agricultural 
center for northeast Arkansas. It reflects a standard population 
figure of 32,000; however, on any given day the population booms to 
well over 50,000 people stemming from local trade in the surrounding 
rural area. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police have calculated necessary ratios for 
cities having populations between 20,000 and 49,000. The FBI revealed 
in the 1980 Uniform Crime Report that a police officer ratio of 1.9 
per thousand population should be employed in small urban centers, 
while IACP initiated a 1 officer per 500 population statistic. 
Although these figures are based on national trends and Jonesboro, 
Arkansas does exhibit a certain degree of uniqueness, these ratios 
propose that Jonesboro (a city of 32,000) should support approximately 
64 sworn police officers. 
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The current manpower force of the Jonesboro Police Department is 
44 sworn personnel. Statistically, it is impossible for the Jonesboro 
Police Department to provide efficient and effective police services 
to the community under existing patrol and manpower conditions. For 
this reason, it is strongly recommended that funding for ten new 
officers and three new civilian dispatchers be allocated immmediately, 
thereby raising the sworn manpower strength of the Jonesboro Police 
Department to 54. 
Police Services. Realizing the service needs of Jonesboro, the 
police department has traditionally accepted certain tasks and 
functions which local merchants have enjoyed. Some of these services 
are the escorting of funeral processions, the custodial security 
provided banks and other merchants during deposit times, and the extra 
security provided certain entertainment and sports activities in the 
area. However, with the increase in city size, population, density, 
and demand for police presence, these services will not be as readily 
available as in the past. All future police services will be 
prioritized as to the urgency and necessity of each demand. Lower 
priority services will be accomplished when manpower and resources are 
available. 
False Alarms. During the year 1980, the Jonesboro, Arkansas 
Police Deparmtent responded to over 875 false alarms. On each 
occasion, at least two officers were sent to the location and an 
average officer time expenditure was calculated at 21 minutes per 
officer per alarm. Thus, for each false alarm, the police department 
allocated approximately 40 minutes and two officers. 
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A blaring statistic regarding false alarms revealed that the 
majority were the result of a handful of private businesses failing to 
fix or improve alarm efficiency. One business had over 200 false 
alarms in the year. For this reason, a false alarm fine (in the form 
of a city ordinance) is strongly recommended. Many cities have 
adopted such a provision. An example of an alarm fine would be the 
assessment of $50.00 against the business for each police response 
after the third false alarm per month. 
Salary Administration. Salary administration in any organization 
is always a most delicate issue. Certainly everyone would like more 
money. On the other hand, the interest of the tax payers must be 
considered, and equity with other city departments is necessary. This 
study revealed two observations which are directly relevant. 
First, referring to the attached table, it is quite obvious that 
patrol officers in the Jonesboro Police Department are substantially 
underpaid. Comparing the salaries of Jonesboro police officers to 
similar jurisdictions, an expansive disparity exists. A proposed 
recommendation of 15 percent increase in officer salary would close 
this disparity; and equal the Arkansas State Police Salary Average for 
cities between 20,000 and 40,000 population. 
The second observation regarding salary structure pertains to the 
differentials between ranks in the agency. It is quite apparent that 
an insufficient differential exists in this regard. This situation is 
attributable to the city's use of a negative step salary scale, e.g. a 
patrol officer upon promotion to Sergeant "steps back" to that salary 
level in the Sergeant's classification which is minimum amount above 
his current salary. Thus, a promotion often means only a nominal 
increase in salary. Salary differential between ranks is generally 
substantial in law enforcement agencies. For this reason, a 12 to 
15 percent step differential is strongly recommended. 
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CITY 
Springdale 
Blytheville 
E1 Dorado 
West Memphis 
Jacksonville 
Fayetteville 
Hot Springs 
. JONESBORO 
TABLE XIII 
CITY POLICE EXPENDITURES AND SALARIES 
IN ARKANSAS, 1981 
(For cities with populations from 20,000 - 40,000) 
TOTAL TOTAL % of BUDGET POLICE 
POPULATION CITY BUDGET POLICE BUDGET TO POLICE SALARIES 
21,200 $ 2,647,456 $ 820,601 
24,600 3,293,128 791,921 
24,900 2,284,582 719,450 
25,000 5,038,500 1,233,950 
26,500 3,013,251 867,879 
34,900 5,065,761 1,002,017 
40,000 7,455,000 1,475,422 
AVERAGE: 
32,900 5,494,623 952,184 
I.A.C.P. National Average for Police Salaries for 
Cities under 40,000 Population ......... . 
Arkansas State Average (from above) 
Proposed 15% Salary Increase . . . . . . 
31% $ 12,876 
24% 11,414 
31% 12,276 
24% 14,928 
29% 12,780 
20% 11,880 
20% 12,706 
25.5% $ 12,690 
17% 
. $ 14,500 
. $ 12,690 
$ 12,700 
11,052 
N 
C 
N 
RECOMMENDATIONS - JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
May 12, 1981 
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The following recommendations are given to Chief Edward 
Cunningham, Jonesboro Police Department based on the research project 
entitled, "Po1ice Patrol Deployment in Urban Centers Under 100,000: A 
Method for Decision-making." 
Patrol Division 
1. Initiate a short 5-10 minute roll call and meeting before 
each shift to dissiminate information. 
2. Require officers to carry and use personal notebooks. 
3. Distribute a list of local stolen cars ("hot" sheet) every 
week. 
4. Eliminate funeral escorts. 
5. Man every patrol district or sector before assigning 
personnel to selective enforcement. Never utilize more than 
two persons as accident investigators per shift. 
6. Require officers to clear from a call before writing 
reports. Stop accident investigators from typing reports and 
making scale diagrams of minor accidents. 
7. Attempt to supply each man with a portable radio. 
8. Buy locking shotgun mounts for police cars. 
9. Standardize police weapon and ammunition. 
10. Continue training officers in survival and patrol techniques. 
Radio-Dispatch Division 
1. Attempt to minimize officers doing the dispatch function; 
utilize civilians in this capacity. 
2. Formulate policy for dispatch procedures. 
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3. Send automatic back-up or cover to "hot" calls and emergency 
situations. 
4. Attempt to minimize the dispatching of cars outside their 
respective districts or sectors for cold calls. 
5. Never allow more than two officers on break at the same time. 
6. Eliminate current dispatch log and reports. Initiate the use 
of recommended log and roll call meetings. 
7. Send patrol cars to felony calls first. Allow the officer to 
assess the situation and then ask for detective if needed. 
8. Block-off dispatch area by covering front windows with a 
curtain. 
9. Attempt to minimize access to dispatch control by locking 
side doors. 
10. If personnel is available, man dispatch control with two 
people. 
Records Division 
1. Standardize all reports. 
2. Eliminate the current incident report and establish one CRIME 
REPORT to be used for every call involving a crime, no matter 
how tri vi a l. 
3. Uti Hze a 3" x 5" card crosstabulation file by name, date of 
birth, address, incident type, and case number. 
4. Initiate sequential case numbers by year; use first two 
digits for the year. 
5. Initiate the use of military time on all reports. 
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6. Keep all original reports in Records Division. Copies may be 
dissiminated to other divisions. 
7. Minimize access to Records Division. 
8. Route all reports to Records Division for dissimination. 
9. Maintain a master report log. 
10. Formulate policy for Records Division Operations. 
THE JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
May 15, 1981 
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The strength of any study lies within the parameters of its data, 
so it is with this report. Based on the 1980 statistical information 
derived from police reports and radio-dispatch logs; and by the 
employment of the previously setforth method of decision-making, the 
following recommendations can be enumerated: 
1. During council with police administrators, the variables of 
incident type, weight factor of call, seriousness of arrest, 
and need for emergency back-up were selected as prioritized 
criteria within the method. Therefore, any procedure to be 
implemented should consider these standards. 
2. The following allocation design can be statistically 
supported based on the subjective criteria used in the method: 
TABLE XIV 
RECOMMENDED ALLOCATION DESIGN 
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Assignment-Availability Factor: 1.85 
Actual patrol officers required: 30 
Shift and Manpower Determination 
7 officers - Morning Shift 
7 officers - Afternoon Shift 
7 officers - Night Shift 
3 officers - Tactical Shift 
7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. 
3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. 
11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. 
6:00 p.m. - 2:00 a.m. 
6 officers - Selective Traffic Enforcement 
Two officers per shift, excluding Tactical Patrol 
3. Figure 8 is a redesign of sector boundaries predicated on 
equalized workload (Kruskal-Wallis Test) and selected 
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criteria. A tactical patrol, "wild" car overlay is utilized 
in the high-crime and high-demand location. It is important 
to note that the overlay unit covers not only the area of 
highest demand but also the times of highest demand. 
Further, the City of Jonesboro represents a natural fit to 
this strategy as the high-demand location is centrally 
located, enabling maximum use of the two-men "wild" car 
technique. 
4. All methods of patrol allocation and distribution emphasize 
the fundamental need for accurate reporting of crime so data 
collected can be used to reveal information of past con-
ditions as well as predict future conditions on which the 
208 
allocation and distribution of manpower can be based. For 
this reason, an evaluation of records and radio-dispatch log 
procedures should accompany the quarterly examination of 
deployment needs. 
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Figure 8: Recommended Sector Design with Tactical Patrol, 
"Wild" Car Overlay. Shaded areas represent high multiple 
response index locations. 
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Figure 8: Recommended Sector Design with Tactical Patrol, 
"Wild" Car Overlay. Shaded areas represent high multiple 
response index locations. 
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- " ~ht Jonesboro Sun., 
Friday, January 23,1981. " SPORTS COMICS CLASSIFIEDS 11. 
JOl'!esboro Police--
Departmen"t Efficiency Studied 
In these days of rising prices 
and limited budgets, many gov-
ernmental agencies - on the 
national, state and local level-
are studying ways to tighten 
their belts in order to operate 
effeciently. 
The Jonesboro Police Depart-
ment is no exception to the rule. 
Robert W. Taylor, criminolo-
gy instructor at Arkansas State 
University, will be donating his 
time and effort to a study aimed 
at maximizing efficiency and 
effectiveness in deploying police 
manpower resources with a li-
mited budget. Taylor explained 
during a press conference at the 
Justice Complex Thursday 
morning that he will conduct an 
analysis of statistical data. 
He added that information 
gathered from the study will be 
used to design Jonesboro as a 
model city of under 100,000 
population in efficient police 
manpower. He also said a model 
city program will attract nation-
al attention through articles he 
hopes to have published in va-
rious journals and other such 
publications. 
Taylor, who has a masters de-
gree in criminology, explained 
the purpose of the study is to col-
lect and analyze a data base by 
which police manpower deploy-
ment can be distributed. This 
will involve coding of every 
radio dispatched police "call" 
for the year of 1980 in Jonesboro 
and the computer-assisted 
analysis of these police re-
sponses. 
"With the price of gas and 
salaries these days, it is impor-
tant for police departments to 
make the best use of police offic-
ers," Taylor said. He added the 
study will question whether 
Jonesboro has enough police 
officers to patrol the city ade-
quately. " 
Taylor said the study will be 
completed in written form with-
in six months. Taylor lists objec-
tives of the study as: 
• The ability to predict rates of 
calls for service. 
• Determination of actual 
manpower (patrol units) needed 
per shift. 
• Design of patrol sectors 
based on equalization of work-
load, priority calls, and geog-
raphical consideration. 
• Design of a dispatch strategy 
based on statistical data pre-
sented. 
• Design of a police dispatch 
radio log. 
• Standardization of police re-
cords and reports. 
Taylor said he hopes the study 
will make Jonesboro a model 
city for other such cities under 
100,000 population to follow. 
Such a program, Taylor added, 
will allow cities to operate more 
efficiently on limited budgets, 
while at the same time offer a 
greater police protection. 
Figure 9: The Jonesboro Sun, 77:36, Section B, page 1, 
January 23, 1981. 
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Study Indicates-
Police Manpower, 
Salaries Too Low 
By LARRY FUGATE 
An ellletUlve ItUdy of the Jonu-
boro Pollee Departmeot Indlcatea 
the departmeot II aerloully under-
manned and police salarlea are the 
lowest for any Arkanau city In the 
20,000 10 40,000 population rUlle, 
City CouncU memberl were laid 
Monday evenJna. 
Robert w. Taylor, InItNctor In 
and coordinator for law enforce-
ment .tudlea at Arkanau State Unl· 
venlty, laid aldermeo Jone.boro 
police orncen need a 15 per cent 
aeroll the board Ialary bllte JUII to 
reacb a .tale-wlde aVOrqe of police 
salaries pald by munlclpalltlel In 
the population faDle. 
Taylor lald tbe ltudy indicate. 
manpower.bortqeo could poll mil·· 
jar problem., notlnt! frequeotly only 
one or two orncers are avalilble to 
anlWer complalnllin tbe city. 
The 128 pqe ItUdy report wa. pre-
pared by Taylor al bli dllsertatlon 
requirement for a doctor of pbllolO-
pby In urban ltudles degree from 
Portland State Unlvenlty in Port· 
land, Ore. 
ChIef of Police Edward M. CUD· 
nlnllbam told aldermeo be aareed to 
allow Taylor to ltudy the depart· 
menl'l recordl (or 1980 after recelv· 
inll8uthorizatlon from the councU', 
Fire and Police CommiUee, a~dinll 
he did nol receive a copy until 
Monday. 
"1 IbinIt II Is an excellent study 
and reOects the needs of the Jones· 
boro Police Departmenl." CunnlnS' 
ham said. "I aaree with Ihe recom· 
mendalion. outlined in Ihe sludy 
furnished to the aldermen. 
"I think salaries are low, a ..... 
nectedln thelttldy. I c:ld nollmow be 
wa. 10lnrlO do Ibll ( .. Iary 
analylll)." 
Taylor, a former policeman, said 
ba conducted altUdy Involvlnll8,360 
complalnl. and can. lOlled by 
pOlice durlnll lUI year. Cunn!nlI. 
bam said lOme complalnllflled with 
the Criminal Inveatillation DlvilloiJ 
were nol &mODI \bole IIUdlea by 
Taylor. 
Taylor lave aldmnasa fOW'p&Ie 
lilt of rellDmmendatlDIII. They in-
cluded: 
• lncre&le tba number of COIIlIIIiI-
.Ioned officers by 10, addInlI three 
clviUan radio dllP&lcben. The de-
parlmenl b .. 4t commllllon"d 
officen. 
Taylor ltated In bill recommeoda-
tiona tbal II II "lmpolilbl. for tba 
Jone.boro Police Department 10 
provide efficlenl and effective 
police .ervicel 10 the communlty 
underexl.tInt! patroland manpower 
condition.. tI 
Tbe recommended level II one 
officer per sao rIIldeoll, or lit for a 
city thesize of Jonesboro. "We don'l 
need lit. We need 54. We bave a low 
crime rale and wanllO keep II tbal 
way." 
• Placing • low priority on lOme 
functinnJ now provided by the de-
parlmenl, Including escort. for 
funerals, securlly provided for 
sports and enlertalnmenl evenl. 
and c:ualodlal security provided for 
banks and men:hanll. 
• A propoied ordinance tbal would 
authorize a fine for turninS In falle 
alarms. The departmenll'elpOllded 
10 875 false alarm. durlni 19110, the 
study sald, Including more \ban :zoo 
alone bu.lnell alon •• Molt falle 
alarm. w.re blam.d on faully 
equ1pmasl. 
Department p.r.onnel .pent 
tnorethan580lIIIII-bounanswer!q 
falle alarmI durInI ueo, equal 10 14 
w .. kI of work by on. officer 
UIIIDed to a 40 hour work wedl. 
The 'Ndy AId many dtl .. have 
adopled ordinancli tbat would 
..... a buIIneu or individual S50 
for eaeb police fIIPOIIH after tba 
third falle alarm In one mOllth. 
• The Ialary fBDIIII benreeo rankI 
II minimal. Taylor recommeDdecla 
12 to 15 per cenl differential to eo-
courqe officen to work for prom~ 
lion. "There II 110 reward fordolni a 
I(oodjob." 
• SaluIeIlbou1d be InI:reued by 
15 per ceDt, ralJInI tba annuallal-
ary of a patrolman with tIlree yean 
aperelnce from SI1,O$l to S12,700. 
Arkanau cltIn lUl'Veyed In the sal· 
ary lIudy Included Sprln,dale, 
Blytheville, EI Dorado, Well Mem· 
pbll,Ja~vIll~Fay~eand 
HotSprlnl •. 
A patrolman with the West Mem· 
phil Police Departmenl dra.1 a 
S14,928 annual .alary afler Ihree 
yean. 
Taylor noted In tba IIUdy Jones-
boro baa the IeCOIIdlaraeatmunlclp-
al' budlel of the elabl cltle. sur-
veyed, but only allocal .. 17percasl . 
of the munlclpeJ budpt for police 
lervicel. The percenta;e of munl· 
clpal buqeu earmarked for police 
lervicel rUlled from 31 per cenl 
(Sprlnlda1e and El Dorado) 1020 
per cenl (Fayetteville and HOI 
(See POUCE Pqe Z) 
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Sprlnl')' 
Police manpower IIlPf18d thin, 
Taylor told aldermen, wllb only 
"one to two officen 011 the _ al 
any lliveo tim .... However, be said 
officen answer the averqe com· 
plaint In fOW' mlnules and 44l1COnd, 
well below national norml • 
• He recommended c:baniIni the 
boundarieI of the four patrolllCtOn 
or bea .. and the alllllJlllleot of a 
twO-man tactical car to answer cer-
tain type call •. The latter, be ex· 
plalned, abould be aIIlIn~ 10 work 
from 6 In Ibe evenlnl 10 2 In d.e 
mornlnl durlnl Ibe period wben 
officen receive Ibe moll com· 
plalnlL 
Taylor AId the study Indlcaled 70 
per cenl of the calli answered by 
police were In an area bounded by 
cale on the north, Kilebeo on the 
easl, Neltleton on Ibe soulb and 
Flinl on the west. 
Other areal Involvlnll an unusual· 
ly blab percenlalle of calli, Includ· 
InlI traffic accldeoll and criminal 
complalnll, weraln North and Eul 
Jonesboro. 
The IaUer area IncIucIe4 Caraway 
Road from Matthewa to a poInl be-
tween HIlIbIand and Race. The Ial' 
ler area hal the blabell accldeot 
rale In the clty. 
Taylor said Ibe area In Nortb 
JOIIesboro II bounded on the north 
by Farrell, CulberboUie on the 
Well, Jobnaoa 011 the IOIIth and Allis 
011 the UlII. 
Aldmneo accepted the ItUdy and 
recommendation. wllboUI com· 
meol. 
Herbert Davll, director of the 
munlclpal Departmenl of I!'Inance 
and Admlnlslratlon, wa. asked 
wbalbethouabloftherecommeoda· 
tiona. He answered with a queatiOll. 
"Wbve do we lilt the money?" 
CunnlnQbam wa ... ked If be 
thoullbl any of the recommenda-
tion. would be adopled. "You'll. 
bave to ta1k to the City CoulIcU," be 
replied.. . 
Alderman Junlcr Hageomacber 
AId after the cotmcU meetlntr ad-
jqumed be bad hoped Taylor wou1d 
alIO recommend "a formula for the 
revenue." 
"I'm DOt maIdna any commenta 
011 wbere the money Ibou1d come 
; from," CUllDlnlbam .ald In re-
o IPO!'II to a qullllan. ''ThaI II tba 
preroptlve of tba City CouncIl." 
CunnlnIIwn AId Taylor hal alIo 
conducted evaluatlou of PolI.ce de-
par\IIIastalnDetroltandEutw. 
1nlI, Mleb., u a D:lember of a team 
uaIaned to the qenc:lel. 
N 
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Mayor Aware Police Underpaid 213 
Jonesboro Mayor Neil Stallings 
told listeners of KASU's Current 
Focus radio program Wednesday he 
has known for some time that city 
police officers are underpaid, 
However, he added some "figures" 
used in a extensive Police Depart-
ment study may be incorrect and 
are being checked. 
Stallings said the study, which 
was done by Robert W. Taylor, in-
structor in and coordinator for law 
enforcement at Arkansas State Uni-
versity, is "certainly partly cor-
rect." However, there are still some 
questions concerning parts of the 
study. 
Taylor submitted the 128 page 
study to Jonesboro alderman Mon-
day night during their regular meet-
ing. In the study, Taylor said Jones-
boro needs a additional 10 city offic-
ers and three radio dispatchers. He 
also said that officers salaries 
should be raised 15 percent. 
Stallings told listeners that he bad 
not seen the study until Monday 
night and has not drawn any definite 
conclusions. However, he said he 
has known for "a long time" that 
city employes, including police, are 
underpaid, and for the past 15 years, 
be said he has tried to add to salaries 
as much as possible. 
However, Stallings questioned the 
proposal in the study of a 10 officer 
increase. He said that Jonesboro bas 
a lower crime rate than most cities 
it's size has, citing that "five or six 
years ago," Jonesboro had the 
lowest crime rate of cities of 25,000 
or more population in the country. 
He said that crime rate is still low . 
"The residents of the city are the 
ones that should tell me (if addition-
al officers are needed)," Stallings 
said. "We don't have all the prob-
lems that other cities have." ' 
Stallings said he thought that the 
city needed about three more offic-
ers on duty. He added that Jones-
boro may not need as many officers 
as other cities used in the study for 
comparison. 
The mayor told listeners that, 
while not completely bleak, the ci-
ty's financial condition is not as good 
as it has been. 
He explained that because of state 
and federal cuts, "some services 
have and will be cut." The mayor 
added that some city services that 
have been enjoyed by city residents 
in the past will be discontinued. 
"People will just have to do some of ' 
this on their own," Stallings said. 
However, Stallings added that 
state and federal cuts would not be 
as hard felt if the city could levy a 
one-cent sales tax, adding many in-
dividuals who don't live in Jones-
boro are using city services when 
they come to Jonesboro to shop and 
work and are not paying for the ser-
vices. Such a tax, he said, would 
bring their money in for city use and 
, help lighten the tax burden on Jones-
boro residents. 
Stallings said he would do every-
thing he could to generate interest in 
such a proposal. He, quickly added 
he will not pursue the issue if resi-
dents did not show some kind of in-
terest. 
Stallings said a one-cent sales tax 
would generate some $2.5 million 
dollars for the city annually. "This 
sort of thing could decrease some 
things Jonesboro residents. are 
paying for," he said. 
Jonesboro, Stallings said, has 
been fortunate in recieving grants. 
The city has received some 51.5 mil-
lion of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) grants in the last year 
to renovate the "poorer section of 
town." 
"They (those who award grants) 
know that if Jonesboro is given a 
grant, the job will be done," Stall-
ings said. Stallings credited Jim 
McKinnon, director of the Jones-
'boro Urban Renewal and Housing 
Authority, with a job ~ell done. 
Current Focus is presented each 
Wednesday at 11 in the morning by 
KASU and sponsored by the Jones-
boro League of Women Voters. 
Figure 11: The Jonesboro Sun, 77:153, Section A, page 2, 
Jonesboro, Arkansas, May 7, 1981. 
Mayor, Researcher 
. Dispute Police Study 
By 'roNY BIFPLB Stallings said the city cannot afford to 
~, ~Appell hire additional policemen or civilian dls-
patchers unless another source of revenue 
• JONFmWRO, Ark. - A repon that calls becomes available. Both he and CUnning· 
law enforcement conditions in Jonesboro hamsuggestedaon&Centsalestaxasapossi. 
"impossible" has provoked disagreement ble revenue source. 
between the mayor and the repon's author. "A on&Cent sales tax would be one good 
Mayor Neil Stallings said he would be way to ~~::~ey to run the city govem· 
"highly surprised" if all the information in ment," am said. "It's a fail' tax, if 
a study by Roben Taylor is accurate. Taylor, any tax can be fair." 
coordinator of law enforcement studies at Stallings said the sales tax was "in the 
Arkansas State University, presented a sum· wings," but would have to be approved by 
mary of b:is 128-page repon on the Jones- Jonesboro voters in a referendum. He said 
boro Police Department to the City Council an election on the question could be held 
Monday night. later this year. 
Stallings said he agreed with the repon Without the tax, the mayor said there was 
that Jonesboro policemen should be paid DO way to hire additional policemen. ''We 
more. He said he doubted; however, that the don't pay our officers enough," Stallings 
percentage of the city budget spent on the said, "but we pay all we have to pay them 
Police Department, as given in the study, is with." 
accurate. . 
The study said Jonesboro spends 17 per 
cent of its money on police protection. Stall· 
ings Sl!id the figure was closer to 30 per cent. 
The study indicated Jonesboro spends a 
smaller percentage of its city budget on its 
police than other Arkansas cities of similar 
StalliDp, C1uulinJham and Taylor all 
agreed priorities have to be set regarding 
spending city funds, but Taylor took the 
strongest exception to the city's current pri· 
ority list. 
size. 
''Having been ~ police officer," Taylor 
said, "I'm appalled at the conditions in the 
". d' ha Jonesboro POlice Department. At these saJa. on t care w t per cent we get/' said . ries, law enforcement is not a profession. 
Jonesboro Police Chief Bd Cunningham. The individual officers are to be highly 
"fm only interested in getting the money commended for adapting to Jonesboro's 
that insures Jonesboro has an effective po- spending policies." 
lice department - whether it's 7 or 17 per Taylor's study compares salaries of Jones-
cent is unimponant. 
"111 run the deftllPhnent with what they boropolicemen with other police salaries in 
gi ..... - Arkansas cities of similar size. Those com· ve me to run it with." parisons are being checked by city Finance 
C1IJIJliqbam aid be had DO rtIIOn to birector Herb Davis, Stallings said. 
doubt the accuracy of Taylor's study deallng . The study, according to Taylor, discov· 
with salaries and police budgets. He said the ered that Jonesboro has a "portrayed low 
parts of the study concerning the actual crime rate." Taylor said the city's low crime 
operations of the department were "accu. rate figures do not reflect incident or com· 
rate - period" ~use they were based on plaint reports that do not require police fol· 
the department's own records. lowup investigations. 
The study, Taylor's doctoral thesis, makes Taylor said conditions in Jonesboro today 
five recommendations: make it "impossible" to provide efficient 
• Hire at least 10 policemen and 3 civilian and effective police protection. "It's only a 
radio dispatchers. . . matter of time," be said, "before a police-
• Change boundaries of Jonesboro's four . man gets hun or a person gets hun due to 
police districts to equallze the work loads of inadequate police protection." 
each and create a "fifth district," which . 
would overlap the two districts most often 
requesting police help. 
• Continue plactng alowprlority on some 
police functions, such as funeral escorts and 
security at sporting events. 
214 
• Increase pay. . 
• Increase the pay differences between 
ranks in the department . 
Figure 12: The Commercial Appeal, 142:128, 
Section B, page 1, Memphis, Tennessee, 
Taylor was defending his study this week 
after the mayor said on a local radio r.ro-
gram that the study may be comparing 'ap' 
pIes to oranges" in some instances. . 
'Tm offended that the mayor questioned 
my ability to pomy the city oi Jonesboro .. 
. . The study was fact, not conjecttij'e," Tay· 
lor said, adding be had assisted with similar 
studies for Bast Lan.'iing and Detroit while a 
student at Michigan State University. 
May 8, 1981. 
